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The development of modern corporate 
governance in China and India 
NICHOLAS CALCINA HOWSON 
AND VI KRAMADITYA S. KHANNA 
I. Introduction 
Corporate governance reform has become a topic of considerable debate 
both in the US and in many emerging markets. Indeed, the discussion is 
important because these reforms may have potentially long-standing 
effects upon the global allocation of capital, and in understanding the 
ways in which governance norms are communicated across markets and 
nations in an ever-globalizing world. In this chapter we examine the 
corporate governance reform efforts of the world's two biggest and 
fastest growing emerging markets, the People's Republic of China 
(PRC or China) and India. In the process we find that our understanding 
of how and why corporate governance reform comes about, where it leads, 
and what value it has can vary significantly, but still shares some com­
monalities that are of considerable theoretical and practical importance. 
The inquiry commenced in this chapter is inspired by certain key 
facts. First, China and India are growing at a remarkable and unpre­
cedented pace and seem to have survived the 2008-9 Global Financial 
Crisis better than most other economies. Second, China and India are 
not Western countries, but have been heavily influenced by "globalized" 
Anglo-American notions of corporate law, corporate governance 
norms, and securities regulation. Third, China and India are presently 
two of the most popular destinations for foreign capital in the world -
whether via foreign direct investment (FDI) in essentially private (or 
pre-public) transactions or public capital markets transactions. Fourth, 
both India and China have undergone, and are progressing through, 
incredibly important (indeed world-changing) programs of economic 
reform and restructuring. At the same time they are increasingly -
in the Chinese phrase - "opening to the outside world." These are 
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the shared "facts" of our inquiry, which of course are met by many 
deep differences, in particular relating to the history, internal organiza­
tion and political and economic structures of the two great nation­
civilizations. However, we believe that the common "facts" recited 
above - rapid economic development, significant private and public 
foreign investment, economic, structural and legal/regulatory reform, 
speedy recovery from the Global Financial Crisis, and a shared interest 
in (if not implementation of) in essentially Anglo-American corporate 
law norms provide an interesting and rich platform for consideration of 
popular or contested corporate governance and corporate governance 
reform precepts. 
To engage in this exploration, we approach the task in several sections. 
Section II provides the background for examining the development of 
corporate governance reform in China and India. We examine in skeletal 
form the political, economic, legal and other features animating the 
environments in both countries. Section III examines the development 
of modern corporate governance reform in India which, unlike many 
other emerging markets, was largely initiated by industry (rather than 
being, for example, scandal driven). Section IV begins with detailed 
discussion of the modern effort at corporate business organization in 
China, and the program of reform applied to the corporate governance 
implemented subsequently. In particular, we examine how the advent of 
"corporatization" (a strategy to finance underperforming state-owned 
enterprises (SO Es) ) ,  along with certain central government agencies and 
reform-oriented individuals in China, helped further the development 
and reform of modern Chinese corporate governance. Section V explores 
what the Indian and Chinese experiences can tell us about broader 
theoretical issues animating the corporate governance literature. In 
particular, we examine what we can learn about the impact of "legal 
origins" (common law or civil law) as compared to "politics" on the 
development of stock markets in the two countries. In addition, we 
discuss whether India and China provide evidence for some kind of 
convergence in corporate law. We find that the support for the "legal 
origins" view is not strong, but that the "politics" account seems more 
relevant in explaining stock market development in India and China. 
Further, while there is a good deal of evidence of partial formal conver­
gence in corporate law, we cannot identify the same or expected conver­
gence in ownership or corporate structure. This creates an odd fit 
between corporate and securities law and the corporations they shape 
and regulate, suggesting some path dependence. Section VI concludes. 
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II. Background environments in China and India 
Before discussing the development of corporate governance reform in 
China and India it seems useful to provide some context for the discus­
sion. Although there is presently great enthusiasm about the prospects 
for both countries, it is important to note the similarities and differences 
between them. 
In terms of similarities, both countries are geographically vast with 
very large populations. 1 They both also have huge urban populations, 
but still sizeable rural areas. Further, China and India possess ,large and 
highly successful diasporas throughout the world, which are involved in 
varying degrees with the growth and success in their countries of origin. 
Moreover, both countries started their lives in modern times as post­
colonial independent or newly autonomous nations at roughly the same 
time ( 1 947 and 1 949), with both initially adopting less market-oriented 
policies. Nevertheless, over the last three decades both countries have 
implemented market-oriented reforms that have led to phenomenal 
growth rates and nearly geometric expansion in international trade 
connections and access to global capital markets. Indeed, they have 
become the most attractive destinations for foreign direct investment, 
and now routinely record the world's largest initial public offerings and 
capital markets corporate finance transactions. Finally, although both 
countries are generating significant growth, they are still plagued by 
some of the familiar problems of emerging markets: slow (and sometimes 
ill-prepared and politically compromised) judiciaries, corruption at 
various levels, and acute infrastructure problems (e.g., electricity, roads). 
This, however, is where most of the similarities end. In terms of 
political structure the two countries are quite different.2 India is a 
functioning democracy with many political parties and active elections, 
whereas China remains a one Party state, whereby the state is ruled 
absolutely by the Communist Party of China. 3 In addition to this, 
1 Many of the facts noted in this paragraph come from a variety of sources. See, e.g.: 
Yasheng Huang and Tarun Khanna, "Can India overtake China?" Foreign Policy, July­
August 2003; The Economist (2006) ; and Business Week (2005) (article on China-India). 
2 Huang and Khanna, "Can India overtake China?". 
3 China's political and governance structure is theoretically divided between: the Party 
(under the Politburo), the state (under the executive (State Council and its ministries)), 
the legislature (the National People's Congress) and the military (the People's Liberation 
Army, under the Central Military Commission, the Chairman of which is a Party 
appointee). The state (executive and legislature) and military are in fact controlled by 
the Party through Party appointments to what appear to be state or military institutions. 
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although both countries have populations including different groups of 
people, the heterogeneity in India is quite broad relative to that in China. 
There are many official languages in India (over 20), no clear majority 
group (except arguably "Hindus") ,  and the presence of parallel legal 
systems operating simultaneously throughout the country. These factors 
simply underscore the heterogeneity reflected in India's population. The 
population's heterogeneity, absence of a clear majority group, and dem­
ocracy in India mean that it is considerably more difficult to pass orders 
from the "top" and expect them to be followed at the grass roots.4 
Indeed, India's policies have tended to flow from the grass roots 
upwards. While China proclaims its more than 50 "national minorities;' 
it is a far more homogeneous polity in ethnic and language terms. 
China's political and institutional culture is a work in progress, and 
certainly the significant contest between central and regional (or local) 
authority has been exacerbated by the devolution of political and eco­
nomic decision making in the Reform era. Notwithstanding, China is 
still formally a unitary state, and its governance and reform experience 
has long been more "top down" than that made necessary and possible 
by India's historical and political development.5 
Nowhere are these political differences seen more than in the 
approach toward economic development and the financing of it. China 
commenced its domestic economic reforms concurrent with a financing 
strategy that focused on raising FDI - initially private foreign investment 
and in the last 1 5  years foreign equity participation in public capital 
markets. Only recently has it turned to domestic capital. India, on the 
other hand, began by attempting to develop local talent and only then 
focused on the attraction of FDI. This was not only a result of historical 
aversion in India to foreign investment post-colonization, but also 
4 When there is no clear maJonty in a democracy, coalitions become necessary. 
Moreover, when there are many different groups (i.e., high heterogeneity) one cannot 
simply ignore some groups because one may have to enter into coalitions with them later. 
This suggests more consensus-oriented decision-making. 
5 Note, this is not to suggest that China has no need for consensns decision making - it is 
simply a relative statement compared to India. Moreover, China does have divisions: 
horizontally between the various regions in China, and vertically between the central and 
local levels. Many of these tensions have become exacerbated in recent years as different 
areas of China develop at radically different speeds, and the gap between rich and 
productive coastal (and in some cases interior) urban areas and the countryside widens. 
At this time, the central government is attempting to address this widening disparity, 
often relying upon a difficnlt-to-implement re-centralization to effect it. 
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because consensus decision-making would have made it difficult to 
follow a path of simply encouraging foreign investment in India. 
The result, at least at this point in history, is that while China's growth 
has outpaced India's there are few truly indigenous Chinese firms (and 
only a handful not built on a pre-existing SOE or local government­
promoted enterprise) that are considered internationally competitive, 
whereas many completely indigenous and non-state owned Indian 
firms compete internationally in many of the highest growth fields (high 
tech, pharmaceuticals, biotech) .  Indeed, in the early stages of China's 
capital markets development, China placed restrictions on the ability 
of non-SOE firms to raise capital largely to reduce the compet1t1ve 
threat they would pose to China's then cash-hungry and increasingly 
corporatized SOEs.6 
However, FDI is only one small part of the reform programs that both 
countries have put into effect. We simply note that both countries have 
moved away from the communist (China) or somewhat socialist (India) 
visions they possessed and toward more mixed market economies. China 
has in fact moved to a kind of "wild west" autocratic capitalism, where 
control and often ownership remain vested in state or state-tied actors, 
limited duopolies flourish, and the state does not provide any real social 
support for broader society. 
In China this has involved, amongst other things, the "corporatiza­
tion" process (described in greater detail in Section IV) wherein a 
number of SOEs are being, or have been, reorganized as corporations 
in law, but not privatized in any real sense. Although there were excep­
tions for sensitive areas ( e.g., national security and major infrastructure 
or energy), most non-sensitive previously state owned assets have been 
devolved to local level government actors (which function at differing 
levels of entrepreneurialism) or into private, entrepreneurial, hands. 
The relations between the enterprises and other economic actors have 
become increasingly subject to a marketplace where prices are not 
controlled, and value-creating transactions ( including finance transac­
tions) are described and normatively enforced "under law."7 
6 Although the Chinese Communist Party has, since 1979, engaged in an aggressive 
program of economic reform, it has been far more cautious about anything that might 
relate to, or trigger, political reform. 
7 Indeed, growth has been stimulated by local level enterprises (many originally permitted 
"collective" enterprises), foreign funded enterprises (which have been the lynchpin of 
China's export-led growth) ,  and private enterprises (especially in "new" sectors where 
neither SOEs nor collectives were present, for example in the Internet-related sector). 
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In India, SOEs are being privatized on a case-by-case basis. Although 
the process has been erratic at times, it appears to be on somewhat 
more solid footing now. The newly privatized entities have been revamped 
and some are considered very profitable and are market leaders.8 
These reforms, among other factors, have led to tremendous growth in 
both countries. We will not rehearse the numbers here except to note that 
in most numerical categories China has outperformed India ( e.g., gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth around 9% compared to 5% to 6% for 
India), but in the last few years the gap has narrowed considerably.9 
Clearly, economic growth is important for both countries. In China, it 
may be most important, as it may be the last and only way that the 
Communist Party can maintain the support and affection of Chinese 
citizens. At the same time, there is a sense in which India's growth -
although by no means evenly distributed - is less skewed than China's. 
The broader base of growth in India implies somewhat greater political 
stability and support. In China if growth were to slow significantly then 
some fear that those who have not benefited from growth might react 
to weakening economic conditions and add to China's already roiling 
social discontent. This scenario only highlights how important sustained 
growth in China is - politically - for the Chinese Communist Party and 
its continuing hold on power. Good governance at the enterprise level, 
and the resulting efficiency gains, are thus of paramount importance in 
the political-economic calculations of China's leadership. 
In light of the sheer speed of China's economic growth and its political 
importance, it seems surprising that China's stock markets languished 
for the five year period between 2000 and 2005, while India's boomed 
over the same period. One set of reasons for this difference, other than the 
structures of the respective financial sector, was the situation regarding 
corporate governance at the enterprise level and general rule oflaw concerns 
in China. Before briefly touching on those it is perhaps noteworthy that 
8 An example would be Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation oflndia (ICICI) Bank. 
9 For the past twenty-five years China has seen average annual GDP growth rates of more than 
9% (except for two years); since 1999, the PRC has seen steadily ascending percentage 
increases in GDP growth on the year earlier from 7.5% ( 1999) to just under 10% (2005). The 
economy has other strengths too: national revenue growth has averaged 18% since 1994, the 
current deficit is only 1 .6% of GDP, and public debt is less than a quarter of GDP; and China 
currently has almost US$850 billion in foreign exchange reserves, and one of the world's 
highest savings rates (approximately 40% of GDP). Much of the information contained 
in this paragraph is taken from James Miles' excellent China Survey in The Economist, 
25 March 2006, p. 12. Also for greater comparative discussion oflndia and China see Huang 
and Khanna, "Can India overtake China?". 
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India and China came at the problem of corporate governance from 
different perspectives. In India corporate governance reform was built on 
a pre-existing corporate landscape and started with the private sector 
and only later became an issue for the public sector as well, whereas in 
China it worked the other way round. 10 This is not surprising given that 
in China there were initially few, if any, truly private enterprises with a 
large appetite for capital, only newly corporatized SOEs. Accordingly, 
corporate governance concerns in China focused first on what we might 
think of as public sector firms. Nonetheless, the starting point for 
corporate governance reform - although not surprising in each. country 
- is l ikely to have important implications for the shape of how that 
reform occurred and is likely to proceed. 
Having begun discussion of some corporate governance differences 
between the countries, we proceed now to briefly sketch out some other 
legal differences of note. 1 1  Legislation in India is seen as being more 
transparent and shaped more by the rule of law than in China where 
there appears to be considerable opacity in determining who is drafting 
laws, with what degree of technical expertise, and in the service of what 
policies. Moreover, various state departments and agencies in China are 
able to issue regulations which often have greater specificity, and force, 
than "law" promulgated by the legislature. Additionally, in India, 
although the judiciary operates on a somewhat glacial time frame, it is 
considered more experienced with commercial matters. Chinese courts 
are generally considered less technically competent and not nearly as 
autonomous or politically independent as their Indian counterparts. 
Some may attribute these distinctions to somewhat artificial assignments 
of legal system affiliation/origins: between common law ( India) and civil 
law ( China) . We explore this issue more fully in sub-section V.A, but suffice 
to say for now that these labels are somewhat misleading. In particular, 
China's developing legal system is a more mixed bag of different legal 
systems and regimes than the obscuring "civil law" designation conveys. 12 
10 Governance concerns emanated first from the SOEs and that is where most of the 
legislation has been. However, governance reform is now happening in China's for­
eign-funded enterprises, reformed collectives, and newly established private enterprises. 
11 Huang and Khanna, "Can India overtake China?" 
1 2  Many PRC scholars will articulate easy assurances that the PRC has established a "civil 
law" system (dalu faxi). Although one can examine why this view became common, we 
avoid that and instead simply note that China's modern, post-Reform, legal system was 
based on an imperfectly understood Stalinist Soviet system (itself channeling prior 
Alexandrine reforms from the nineteenth century) .  That system was attached to a prior 
tradition of law which has existed in China for more than 2,000 years (what Qu Tongzu 
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With this background we now examine the development of corporate 
governance reform in India and in China. Although we have noted some 
differences between the countries, we want to re-emphasize that there 
remain many commonalities too - rapid economic development, 
significant private and public foreign investment, economic and 
structural reform, and a shared interest in (if not implementation of) 
Anglo-American corporate law norms which we will argue provide an 
interesting and rich platform for consideration of popular or contested 
corporate governance and corporate governance reform precepts. 
III. The development of corporate governance in India 
The reform of corporate governance is a worldwide phenomenon. In the 
last decade India has engaged in an ambitious series of reforms. In order 
to better understand the context of these reforms, we briefly discuss the 
corporate governance situation in India prior to these reforms. 
Modern corporate governance in India dates back to the later half of 
the 1 800s under the British Raj . By the time of Independence in 1 947 
India had functioning stock markets and a comparatively well-developed 
model of corporate governance. Following Independence the Indian 
government pursued socialist policies that led to the growth of the state 
owned sector and a greater role for the state as the primary provider of 
debt and equity capital. The results included a decline in corporate 
governance. By 1991  the financial position of the Indian government 
was quite precarious. This led it to embark on a series of market oriented 
reforms involving a retraction of the state from the corporate sector and 
a general liberalization of the economy. By the mid 1 990s Indian indus­
try began to search for capital to expand into the competitive spaces 
being left open by the liberalization policies. The need for capital, 
amongst other things, led to the first forays into corporate governance 
reform in India starting with the Confederation of Indian Industry's 
called "the Confucianization of Law") ,  and then a German-influenced system (mediated 
through Meiji Japan) implemented by the late Qing and then Guomindang Republican 
governments of the 1 920s and 1 930s. After 1979, and the advent of "legal construction," 
and always based on the pre-existing Soviet-inspired system, China has been subject to a 
number of strong influences, depending upon the specific sector of "law" implicated. for 
instance, in the corporate and securities law spheres, the influence of US-style corporate 
law and securities law - notwithstanding the adjacency of British law haven Hong Kong -
has been near overwhelming. This no doubt is a result of the pervasive influence of US 
ideas and structures communicated through the US-directed globalized capital markets. 
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Code for Corporate Governance in 1998 which was quickly followed 
by the government enhancing corporate governance via listing require­
ments (in 2000) and amendments to the Company Law. 
In many respects the saga of modern corporate governance in India 
is the story of the prodigal son - a promising start followed by a 
decline with much more recent attempts at enhancing governance. The 
details of how this happened are briefly described in the next few 
paragraphs. 
A. Origins of modern corporate governance 
in India (1866 to 1 947) 
India, unlike a number of emerging markets, has had functioning stock 
markets since 1 875 where much of the activity was organized in the form 
of joint-stock limited liability companies. In light of the early presence of  
corporations in India it i s  not surprising that the regulation of  corporate 
governance started relatively early. From 1 866 onwards there were many 
pieces of legislation governing corporate governance, trust activity, 
banking activity and securities regulation. 13 Moreover, it appears that 
Indian industry grew considerably during World War 11 because the 
Chinese and Japanese economies, which were in some sense competitors, 
were damaged by the war and by wartime activities on their territories. 14 
Thus, by the time oflndependence ( 1 947),  India appeared to have well­
functioning stock markets, an active manufacturing sector, a large 
corpus of corporate and securities laws, and a well-developed banking 
13 Amiya Kumar Bagchi, Private Investment in India, 1900-1939 (Cambridge University 
Press, 1972); Radhe Shyam Rungta, The Rise of Business Corporations in India, 1851-1900 
(Cambridge University Press, 1970). See the Indian Companies Act 1866; Indian Com­
panies Act 1882; Indian Trusts Act 1882; Indian Companies Act 1913; Reserve Bank of  
India Act 1934; 1956 Indian Companies Act (in the process of  being re-written); l 956 
Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act (defines powers and conduct for stock exchanges ) ;  
1985 Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act (bankruptcy provisions for 
financially distressed companies also being re-written) ;  1992 Securities and Exchange 
Bureau of India (SEBI) Act (sets up SEBI - regulator of stock markets). for more 
discussion of the growth of Indian Industry since the beginning of the twentieth century 
see M. D. Morris, "The growth of large scale industry up to 1947;' in D. Kumar (ed . ) ,  
Cambridge Economic History o f  India, vol. II (Cambridge University Press, 1983), 
pp. 553-676. Note that even prior to the 1866 Act there were corporations in India, 
primarily in the Bengal (Calcutta) area. 
14 See Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas, J. R. D. Tata, G. D. Birla, Sir Ardeshir Dalal, Sir Shri 
Ram, Kasturbhai Lalbhai, A. D. Shroff and John Matthai, The "Bombay Plan" for India's 
Economic Development (Bombay: Printed by S. Ramu, at the Commercial Printing Press, 
1944). 
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establishment. 15  Although there were certainly corporate governance 
abuses, the general state of corporate governance and the overall 
economy in India placed it in an enviable position amongst many de­
colonized countries.16 This position was, however, about to receive some 
serious setbacks. 
B. From Independence to liberalization (1947 to 1 991) 
Following Independence the Indian government put into place a number 
of policies that had the effect of weakening corporate governance in 
India. This started with a series of Industrial Policy Resolutions which 
entrusted the state with much greater responsibility for managing the 
economy. 17 The changes wrought by these resolutions included a much 
expanded state-owned sector.18  The government was to become the sole 
provider of many goods and services. 1 9  This led to the nationalization of 
certain industries (in particular financial institutions such as banks and 
insurance companies) and the removal of private firms and competition 
from large sectors of the economy. This would have reduced the com­
petitive pressure to be efficient. Moreover, Indian SOEs were not simply 
15 Rajesh Chakrabarti, The Financial Sector in India: Emerging Issues (New Delhi; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006); Omkar Goswami, "India: The tide rises gradually;' in 
Charles P. Oman (ed.), Corporate Governance in Development: The Experiences of Brazil, 
Chile, India, and South Africa (Issy-les-Moulineaux: OECD Development Center; 
Washington DC: Center for International Private Enterprise, 2003). 
16 Many corporations in India during this time frame were operated under the managing 
agent system. This provided an impetus to dispersed ownership and a separation of 
ownership from control. Although the use of the corporate law statutes helped to contain 
the agency costs that arose from this situation, it was hardly perfect and many instances 
of abuses by managing agents are documented in the modern business history of India. 
See Rungta, The Rise of Business Corporations, pp. 2 19-55. 
17 Rakesh Mohan and Vandana Aggarwal, "Commands and controls: Planning for indus­
trial development in India, l 951-1990" ( 1990) 14 Journal of Comparative Economics 681. 
18 Some of these changes bear considerable similarity to the suggestions laid out by the 
leading Indian Industrialists in the 1944 Bombay Plan. The Plan was to be a blueprint for 
economic growth in India and many of its suggestions seem to have been adopted by the 
first few Indian governments. 
19 There were also some industries where only the state could start new firms. See 
Goswami, "India: The tide." There appeared to be a belief that the private sector, 
domestic and foreign, could not be relied upon to provide these goods and services 
and that they may have incentives that do not enhance social welfare. See Chakrabati, 
Financial Sector; Thakurdas et al., The "Bombay Plan." One expects the suspicion of 
private enterprise may have deep historical roots as the growth of the British Empire was 
tied to the success of the East India Company which had some very serious negative 
consequences for India. 
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being run to maximize profits, but for a variety of additional reasons as 
well.20 In light of this, it is unsurprising that such firms would not focus 
on efficiency as the aim of corporate governance. 
This was accompanied by a series of enactments that worked as entry 
barriers to certain markets and to investment. First, there was a series of 
enactments that required industrial enterprises to obtain a number of 
licenses from various government agencies to conduct business or to 
expand capacity (commonly known as the "license raj" ) .21 The require­
ment to obtain the government's approval provided opportunities for 
rent-seeking and corruption that likely led to a less competitive .environ­
ment for many Indian businesses. The lack of competition would have 
benefited incumbents, but would also have hindered further improve­
ment in corporate governance by reducing the competitive pressure to 
be efficient. 
Second, the government erected barriers to both foreign investment in 
India and to foreign competition. There were large trade barriers and 
tariffs accompanied by limits on how much stock a foreign entity could 
own in an Indian enterprise and requirements for firms to purchase their 
goods from primarily indigenous producers. 22 This insulated domestic 
firms from foreign competition and, when combined with the extensive 
licensing requirements, insulated domestic firms from much further 
domestic competition. 
This was compounded by how private sector firms were capitalized 
and the incentives of the various capital providers to monitor manage­
ment. The primary source of capital for many Indian firms was debt 
capital. This was made available by the state through a variety of state­
owned and -operated development finance institutions (DFis) .23 The 
performance of DFI employees was not assessed based on whether the 
firms they provided funding to made a profit, but rather on the total 
amount of loans that had been made. This, of course, created an incen­
tive to maximize the amount of loans rather than providing loans to 
businesses with viable business plans. DFis then had little incentive 
20 Goswami, "India: The tide." 
21 Goswami, "India: The tide." 
22 Mohan and Aggrawal, "Commands and Controls"; Goswami, "India: The tide:' 
23 World Bank, India: Role of Institutional Investors in the Corporate Governance of their 
Portfolio Companies, World Bank Report (2005); Chakrabarti, Financial Sector; Omkar 
Goswami, Corporate Bankruptcy in India: A Comparative Perspective, Development 
Centre Studies (Paris: Development Centre, Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development; Washington DC: OECD Publications and Information Center, 1996). 
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to monitor management. Indeed, the DFis often favored management 
due to a variety of reasons including corruption and political gain. 
Although the DFis were often the primary credit providers, other 
creditors did exist and would have had some incentive to monitor 
management. This was, however, hampered by the glacial speed of 
India's bankruptcy process. There were inordinate delays in the process 
of restructuring and liquidating a firm (e.g., it could easily take 1 0  years 
to liquidate a firm) and this would have placed these non-DFI creditors 
in an unenviable situation.24 Indeed, it was not very common for private 
creditors to provide credit to anyone but blue chip companies or 
companies backed by government guarantees. Thus, these creditors were 
unlikely to exercise real oversight over management. 
Even if creditors could not or did not monitor management, perhaps 
shareholders could. Here also there were problems . First, the primary 
providers of equity capital were the DFis. Although most DFis would 
provide finance primarily in the form of debt, they might also invest in 
the form of equity when their internal debt ratios would prohibit them 
from funding any more amounts as creditors. Indeed, for many com­
panies the DFis had collectively well over 50% of the equity stock. 
However, the DFis had, as before, little incentive to act as careful 
monitors of management and used to routinely appoint nominee dir­
ectors to the boards of these corporations that would rubber stamp the 
d . . f 25 eos10ns o management 
If the DFis did not exercise oversight, then what about other minority 
(non-management) shareholders they might be able to exercise over­
sight. There was certainly provision in the Companies Laws for minority 
shareholders to raise oppression and mismanagement concerns at 
various adjudicative fora.26 However, they were unlikely to have their 
grievances redressed for the following reasons:27 
First, the Indian judicial system was full of delays and years could pass 
before such litigation would be adjudicated. Second, there appeared to 
be many irregularities in the share transfer and registration process 
which would have further delayed minority shareholders in bringing 
their cases. Third, the disclosure of ownership structure and related 
24 T. C. A. Anant and Omkar Goswami, "Getting everything wrong: India's policies 
regarding 'sick' firms;' in Dilip Mookherjee (ed.), Indian Industry: Policies and Perfor­
mance (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995); Goswami, Corporate Bankruptcy in India. 
25 World Bank, India: Role of Institutional Investors; Goswami, "India: The tide." 
26 See Sections 397 and 408, Indian Companies Act 1956. 
27 Goswami, "India: The tide." 
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party transactions was very opaque in India making it even harder for 
minority shareholders to achieve redress. This was exacerbated by the 
very high tax rates for corporations and individuals, which led to a 
tremendous amount of tax evasion achieved by devising highly compli­
cated cross-holding structures. Although this aided tax evasion, it had 
the by-product of making ownership structure even more opaque to 
minority shareholders. Finally, even if someone tried to buy up shares 
in the corporation from the DFis the government could block share 
transfers that might result in a change in the board that the government 
considered "prejudicial to the interest of the company or the public 
interest." Given that government (via the DFis) tended to vote with 
management one can easily see how this would lead to entrenchment 
of management and little scope for effective oversight by other 
shareholders. 
Of course, even if non-management shareholders and creditors exer­
cise l ittle oversight it may be that management has incentives aligned 
with maximizing wealth as most managements were the promoters and 
initial investors in the company. Here, too, capital structure played an 
invidious role. Because the ultimately passive DFis provided so much 
of the capital (both debt and equity) , the more active and interested 
promoters could maintain control with as little as 1 5  percent of the 
equity of a firm and, given the amount of funding they received in the 
form of debt, the promoters could have maintained control of a firm by 
providing only 3 percent of its capital. 28 With such excessive leverage 
the promoters could recover their initial investment very early on. 
Moreover, with so little invested in the firm the promoters and manage­
ment would face incentives that might diverge quite widely from the rest 
of the shareholders, including the inattentive DFis. The prospect for self­
dealing and moral hazard would loom large in this environment. 
Of course, such a system should have led to considerable looting 
by management and many failed companies. Although the looting did 
occur, the system was insulated from some of the consequences of failed 
companies both by the slow bankruptcy process and by the fact that the 
state could take over failing businesses and keep them afloat to maintain 
employment. The employment dislocation that would otherwise follow 
such policies did not eventuate, but at the cost of increasing the effective 
debt burden for the state. 29 
28 Chakrabarti, Financial Sector; Goswami, "India: The tide:' 
29 Anant and Goswami, "Getting everything wrong." 
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Thus, by 1 99 1  the Indian corporate scene had changed considerably 
from its pre-Independence situation, leading India to become a laggard 
in healthy corporate governance. For state owned enterprises the familiar 
story of lack of competition and little profit incentive contributed to the 
inefficiency of the enterprise and its atrophied corporate governance. 
For private firms corporate governance was ineffective for a number of 
reasons. First, the DFis as large shareholders and creditors played little to 
no monitoring role given the structuring of their incentives and the 
political context in which they acted. Second, the non-DFI creditors 
could exercise only limited oversight given the very slow pace of bank­
ruptcy proceedings in India. Third, minority shareholders (non-DFI 
shareholders) faced considerable obstacles in enforcing their rights. 
There were lengthy judicial delays, little information about related party 
transactions, opacity in ownership structure (largely motivated by tax 
evasion) and irregularities in transferring shares. Fourth, promoters 
could start firms by putting up only the smallest sliver of their own 
capital. When this was combined with the ineffective oversight by other 
parties the potential for mismanagement and fraud becomes quite large. 
Moreover, these private firms faced little competitive pressure to 
improve their efficiency because of the "license raj" system, which 
limited domestic competition, and the high trade and other barriers 
limiting foreign competition. Finally, the employment dislocation that 
might have been caused by very inefficient management leading to failed 
firms was not felt in its entirety because the state could take over failing 
firms and keep their work force employed. This would have reduced the 
political cost of supporting inefficient management. 
This is a recipe for dysfunctional corporate governance and that is 
precisely what India had. In formal terms, India had the laws and the 
legal system to enforce good corporate governance practices, but the 
functioning of the system, the inconsistent disclosure requirements, and 
largely ineffective boards of directors created instead a failing governance 
system. Indeed, Indian firms that were looking for capital were forced to 
look primarily to internal sources or the capital provided by the DFis.30 
30 Asish K. Bhattacharyya and Sadhalaxmi Vivek Rao, "Economic impact of 'regulation on 
corporate governance': evidence from India;' Indian Institute of Management Calcutta 
Working Paper No. 486/2004, January 17, 2004, available at Indian Institute of Manage­
ment Calcutta Working Paper No. 486/2004, January 1 7, 2004 (2005),  available at http:// 
129.3.20.41/eps/fin/papers/0504/0504002.pdf; World Bank, India: Role of Institutional 
Investors. 
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C. Liberalization and corporate governance reform 
(From 1991 to the present) 
The sheer weight and cost of this system came crashing down on the 
Indian economy in 199 1  when the Indian government, in response to a 
financial crisis, embarked upon a general program of liberalization. It 
was the advent of these 1 99 1  reforms that would lead to the corporate 
governance reforms that are examined in this paper. Liberalization was 
to take the form of selling off some of the SO Es and beginning to sell off 
or rationalize the state's interests in other firms. Further, the DFis were 
now to be assessed on "bottom line" measures (i.e., return on assets) 
rather than the amount of loans sanctioned or "assets" created.3 1 More­
over, trade barriers were to be reduced, foreign investment permitted 
(and even encouraged) and the "license raj" to be eased thereby permit­
ting increased domestic and foreign competition. 32 Thus, post- 199 1  
India would have new competitive spaces opening up (where the SOEs 
would no longer be the sole provider of goods or services) , old industries 
becoming more competitive with the inflow of foreign competition and 
new domestic competition, and government institutions more moti­
vated by efficiency than before. Following this the government created 
the securities market regulator - the Securities & Exchange Board of 
India (SEBI) - in 1 992 and slowly granted it increasing powers and the 
mandate to regulate the many domestic stock markets in India.33 This 
was significant because SEBI could take on an adjudicatory role and 
thereby relieve some pressure on the court system and provide more 
timely resolution of disputes insofar as they had publicly traded equity.34 
It is against this backdrop that corporate governance reform would 
develop in India. Indeed, one of the more unique things about Indian 
corporate governance reform is that it was initiated and initially pushed 
by industry. Although there were scandals in the Indian stock markets 
31 Indeed, the DFis were no longer provided the kind of subsidized access to funds they had 
in the past and they were sometimes merged with private entities (World Bank, India: 
Role of Institutional Investors in the Corporate Governance of their Portfolio Companies, 
World Bank Report (2005)). The primary DFis before 1991 were: - IFCI, ICICI, IDBI, 
UTI, UC, GIC and Public Sector Banks. Now there are 3 sets oflnstitutional Investors -
the DFis, new private sector Mutual Funds, and Foreign Institutional Investors. 
32 Anne Krueger (ed.), Economic Policy Reforms and the Indian Economy (University of 
Chicago Press, 2002); Goswami, "India: The tide." 
33 The Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992. 
34 Delays in the Indian Judicial system are well known. See Bibek Debroy, "Some issues 
in law reform in India;' in J .J. Dethier (ed.), Governance, Decentralization, and Reform in 
China, India, and Russia (Boston MA: Kluwer, 2000), pp. 339-68. 
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following liberalization (and even before it) ,  it was when industry got 
involved that reform moved forward quickly. 35 The Confederation of 
Indian Industry ( CII) drafted the first corporate governance code in 
India in 1 998 and it was that code that formed the basis for Clause 49 of 
the Stock Exchange Listing Agreement.36 Indian industry pushed gov­
ernance reform because access to capital was necessary to take advantage 
of the opportunities created by liberalization and to stay ahead of (or at 
least with) the competition.37 However, given the generally poor level of 
governance Indian corporations could not seriously expect domestic and 
foreign investors to provide capital without some greater assurance. 38 
Indeed, some outside enforcement (e.g., via SEBI or the exchanges) 
might be needed to bolster the credibility of any governance reform. 
Thus, the corporate governance reform movement in many respects was 
motivated by a desire to access capital markets to fund investment in 
new business opportunities or to enhance chances in current endeavors. 
Reform was also supported by the increasing presence of foreign invest­
ors, the Indian financial press being quite active, and the desire to access 
US and developed world capital markets.39 
Following the 1 998 CII code, SEBI decided to form the Kumarman­
galam Birla Committee (KMBC) and commission a report on corporate 
governance reform leading to changes in the listing agreement of the 
stock exchanges. The KMBC's draft set of recommendations came out 
on 1 October 1 999 and became effective as Clause 49 of the listing 
agreement with the exchanges on 2 1  February 2000 - a stunning 
5 months later. Firms failing to meet the requirements of Clause 49 could 
be delisted.40 The details of Clause 49 are provided in Appendix 1 5 . 1 ,  but a 
quick overview is provided below. 
Clause 49 had both mandatory and non-mandatory requirements. 
In the mandatory portion were a number of reforms designed to require 
greater independence on boards. This involved prescribing minimum 
percentages of independent directors ( 50% or 33% depending on whether 
the Chairman was an executive director) and significantly tightening 
up the definition of "independence." In addition, Clause 49 mandated 
35 Goswami, "India: The tide:' 
36 See Confederation of Indian Industry, Desirable Corporate Governance: A Code ( 1 998). 
37 See Goswami, "India: The tide"; Chakrabarti, Financial Sector. 
38 See Vikramaditya Khanna, "Corporate governance in India: Past, present and 
f uture?"(2009) l Jindal Global Law Review 17 1-95. 
39 Goswami, "India: The tide." 
40 Now there is the possibility of financial penalties from Section 23 E of 2004 Act. See 
Securities Laws (Amendment) Act, 2004, S. 1 1 .  
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the number of meetings per year, expected boards to develop a code of 
conduct and imposed limits on the number of directorships a director 
could simultaneously hold. Clause 49 also enhanced the power of the 
audit committee both by requiring financial literacy, experience and 
independence, and by expanding the scope of activities on which the 
audit committee had oversight. Executives were also expected to be more 
personally involved in corporate affairs as seen by the requirements for 
certification by the Chief Executive Officer ( CEO) and Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) of financials and overall responsibility for internal controls .  
This was combined with considerably enhanced disclosure ob.ligations 
(on many things including accounting treatment and related party trans­
actions) and enhanced requirements for holding companies when over­
seeing their subsidiaries. These series of changes appear aimed at making 
boards and audit committees more independent, powerful and focused 
monitors of management. Moreover, the enhanced disclosure would aid 
institutional and foreign investors in exercising oversight as well. 
A number of further committees were formed which made a series 
of recommendations ( e.g., Naresh Chandra Committee, Department of 
Company Affairs Report, Malegam Committee, and the Narayana 
Murthy Committee) leading to further changes in the listing require­
ments.4J Additionally, amendments were made to the Companies Law 
and some proposals are still under consideration. Moreover, the corpor­
ate governance of banks was reformed at this time as well.42 
Although there were some changes to the statutory law during this 
period, most of the changes were in the listing requirements. This is not 
too surprising. Changes in listing agreements carry the penalty of 
de-listing, which although significant, is  less personally painful for 
executives than violations of the statutory law which could involve direct 
financial penalties and jail time. Moreover, listing requirements are 
generally enforceable only through SEBI and the exchanges which can 
utilize enforcement discretion thereby softening the impact of the 
changes. This would have dulled opposition to the reforms because the 
cost of non-compliance looks less severe. Indeed, a strategy of first 
changing listing requirements looks very much like an attempt to first 
41 See Murthy Committee (2003); Chandra Committee (2002); Malegam Committee 
( 1995). 
42 Chakrabarti, Financial Sector. In banks the system of nominee directors is being phased 
out and the banks use the CAMELS system (Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Manage­
ment, Earnings Liquidity and Systems and Controls). See Murthy Committee (2003); 
Chandra Committee (2002); Malegam Committee ( 1995). 
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"test the waters" in a relatively low cost way, so that if the change "sticks" 
regulators can proceed with statutory changes thereby providing firms 
with sufficient time to adapt before penalties became more significant. 
Such a strategy is less likely to encounter political opposition and may 
still provide enough assurances to encourage the investment of capital 
in India. This is certainly a plausible way to describe the reforms that 
have occurred in India. 
Indeed, consistent with this the next series of important reforms are 
statutory changes which are to be tabled in front of Parliament soon 
(based on the J. J. Irani Committee's (2005) recommendations) .43 The 
changes will apply to all firms in India (not just those listed on the 
exchanges) .  The proposed changes are summarized in Appendix 1 5 . 1  and 
compared to the changes wrought by Clause 49. 
From our perspective a number of things are noteworthy about the 
Irani Committee's recommendations. Although they tighten up certain 
things and loosen others relative to Clause 49, the overall thrust of the 
recommendations is that the statutory law will permit greater customiza­
tion and self-regulation (e.g., requiring shareholder approvals for execu­
tive compensation) for all companies. Moreover, this will be accompanied 
by greater protection for smaller shareholders, especially in merger trans­
actions. Finally, the process of enforcement is to be streamlined, the 
bankruptcy system upgraded, and the actual legal provisions rationalized 
and simplified (eliminating redundancies and so forth) .  These changes 
are not inconsistent per se with Clause 49. This is because Clause 49 is 
specifically targeted at listed companies and one might expect tighter 
regulation for these kinds of companies (as they raise capital from the 
general public) compared to all firms (listed or not) which may raise 
capital from smaller and perhaps better informed sets of people. 
One could, of course, view the Irani Committee as taking a more 
cautious approach to governance reform than Clause 49. This is perhaps 
not that surprising given that India attracts much more capital now than 
it did before the enactment of Clause 49 (indicating that the marginal 
gain from governance reform now may not be as large) .  In addition, 
there are many firms who have had difficulty in complying in a timely 
manner with Clause 49, indicating that further reform may be fairly 
costly on top of the reforms in Clause 49. 
43 See "Cabinet approves Companies Bill;' The Times of India, August 30, 2008. There is 
also some further movement on disclosures as per the Parekh Sub-Committee Report 
(2008). 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA AND INDIA 531 
Although these governance reforms are important, there are many 
others one could also examine and reform: voting rights, bankruptcy 
reform, and perhaps shareholders suits. Indeed, one might view the 
above-described changes and proposed changes as just parts of a broader 
package of reforms that make capital investment or lending more 
attractive in India. 
IV. The development of corporate governance in China 
Any discussion about corporate governance - and more recently 
improved corporate governance - in China must be prefaced by back­
ground on the broader reform of China's post- 1 949 centrally planned, 
state-owned, economic system and the subsequent formal corporatiza­
tion of state-owned asset groupings. In a word - before there could be 
"corporate" governance or corporate governance "reform," there had to 
be corporations. In the initial stages of Chinese reform, corporatization 
was the repositioning ofline-Ministry operated factories and other state­
owned assets under the umbrella of independent legal persons estab­
lished under law.44 Only in the last decade and a half and after the 
growth of domestic capital markets, the creation of a distinct private and 
public shareholder class (Chinese and foreign),  and the appearance of 
more independent (and themselves corporatized and profit-seeking) 
providers of credit - have these re-organized asset groupings and their 
new corporate identities become the focus of what Chinese participants 
and academic observers theorize as corporate governance "reform." 
Thus, we begin our analysis of corporate governance reform in China 
by addressing (i) how the industrial enterprise system was organized in 
the PRC prior to reform, (ii) the actual process of corporatization (not 
"privatization") which commenced in the mid- 1980s and continues 
today, and (iii) the shifting policy goals over two and a half decades 
which have animated adoption of the corporate form generally in 
reform-era China. 
If, as we posit above, the story of modern corporate governance in 
India calls to mind the tale of the "prodigal son;' then China's encounter 
with the corporate form is something more alarming to the receiving 
44 As will be alluded to below, this process should not be called "privatization" as such 
newly established legal entities continued to be largely owned, and controlled, by 
state administrative departments, themselves reorganized as "holding companies" or 
"controlling groups." 
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parents - the arrival on the family doorstep of a fully formed, overseas­
adopted (or at least foreign-educated) child one had no expectation of 
ever meeting, much less letting onto the premises to race around the 
house freely! 
A. From the Communist Revolution to the start 
of the reform era (1949 to the mid-1 980s) Policy reforms 
The post- 1 949 Chinese economic system was characterized by an over­
whelming reliance on two key mechanisms: (i) central planning and (ii) 
direct bureaucratic-administrative control of the industrial economy's 
productive instruments.45 Productive assets in China were organized 
as SO Es (usually as part of coterminous "work units")  under "line 
Ministries" reporting to the State Council. These Ministries and their 
subordinate bureaus acted as agents of the state in operating the SOEs 
under their charge, with the state in turn deemed to be the representative 
of the ultimate owners - "all the people."46 This structure was consistent 
with orthodox Marxist ideology, and the requirement that ownership of 
the means of industrial production be vested in a certain very large 
group of politically privileged citizens.47 That ideological characteri­
zation dovetailed nicely with the Chinese leadership's perceived require­
ments - especially after the destruction and dislocation of the 
45 The summary provided here is an over-generalization. In truth, the organization of the 
Chinese industrial economy even pre-reform was far more complex and highly differen­
tiated. See Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-
1993 (Cambridge University Press, 1995). However, our summary description in this 
article should prove useful as a template to understand the (under-performing if not 
failing) system in place prior to generalized reform and then implementation of the 
specific remedy directed at failing SOEs, corporatization. 
46 The term "state-owned enterprises" in English is in fact a translation of the Chinese term 
more literally rendered "owned by all the people-system enterprises" (quanminsuoyouzhi 
qiye). Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organizational structure closely shadowed the 
governance structure of SOEs and in fact possessed far more power than formally 
designated enterprise "managers." Even after corporatization and global public offerings 
by transformed SOEs, Communist Party cells or committees continue to have huge 
governance power over Chinese firms, usually more power than the formal board of 
directors, independent directors, or senior management. With respect to the corpora­
tized commercial banks alone, see Nicholas Calcina Howson, "China's restructured 
commercial banks: The old nomenklatura system serving new corporate governance 
structures?" in M. Avery, M. Zhu and J. Cai (eds. ) ,  China's Emerging Financial Markets: 
Challenges and Global Impact (Singapore: John Wiley and Sons, 2009). 
47 Under the Chinese revolutionary scheme, a wider group than merely the "proletariat;' 
and thus inclusive of workers, peasants, military - but excluding those declared to be 
without political rights (class enemies, criminals, etc.) 
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Anti-Japanese War, World War II, the Chinese Civil War and eventual 
Liberation (in 1 949) - for strict central control and planning of the 
industrial economy. At the lowest reaches of this system was the "work 
unit" or danwei, often coterminous with specifically identified SOEs but 
also sometimes subordinate units aggregated into a larger SOE. These 
work units operated at the instruction of the planning bureaucracy and 
had little autonomy. In theory, work units/SO Es were allocated inputs or 
other necessary resources by government bureaucratic actors and then 
closely instructed on production requirements (usually set as quotas or 
directed production levels) . The SOEs then distributed product through 
mandated channels to specified buyers, and collected revenues deter­
mined according to state-controlled pricing. Gross cash in-flows to SOEs 
were immediately remitted, in toto, to the SOE's planning or adminis­
trative superior (i.e . ,  a bureaucratic actor in the line Ministry system),  
with that superior body subsequently re-allocating cash back down to 
the SOE/unit to fund the next temporal cycle of productive activity. 
Importantly, these SO Es/work units also bore the very significant burden 
of certain "social" or non-economic tasks delivering housing, medical 
care, education, day care, retirement support and even entertainment 
for members of the unit or SOE (including their non-employee family 
members) .  
At least until the early 1 980s then, SOEs and the SOE system were 
strangers to common aspects of corporate structuring or corporate law. 
For example, SOEs did not have distinct legal personality, did not 
contract as independent legal persons, and did not formally "own" assets 
they operated or controlled. Instead, SO Es were essentially arms of the 
state bureaucracy and as such were not separate from the political or  
administrative authorities. They merely "operated" but did not "own" 
the assets assigned to their charge. The SOE structure, when set against 
the background of the Communist Party-ruled state, resulted in SOEs 
managed almost entirely by planning and political authorities. This in 
turn had important effects on how these entities were governed: 
First, there were no identified owners of the SO Es (only the political 
fiction of "all the people"), and thus no specific or human actor interested 
in the performance or growth of the assets collected under the umbrella of a 
given SOE. Monitoring by "all the people" was impossible, even if sincerely 
intended, because of the most severe kind of collective action problem. 
The only authority which could monitor the SOEs and their managers 
were the state-bureaucratic organs to which management of these enter­
prises was formally delegated. In any case, at this time SOEs were not 
534 NICHOLAS CALCINA HOWSON AND VIKRAMADITYA S. KHANNA 
tasked with pursuing profitable activity instead, they were responsible 
for fulfilling the commands of centralized planning authorities, using 
centrally allocated funds to manufacture goods, and sell products to stipu­
lated buyers at state-controlled prices. Thus, "monitoring" of SO Es con­
sisted of passive acceptance by higher administrative authorities of annual 
confirmations by subordinate SOE groupings with respect to whether these 
instruments of the planned economy (and indirectly their managers) had 
fulfilled quota production or distribution targets. Likewise, because the 
aim of such SOEs was not to create profits or grow value but to fulfill 
commands. There was no requirement for profit accounting, merely cost 
accounting to track mandated inputs and directed outputs. Similarily, 
because growth of the enterprise qua SOE was entirely irrelevant, there 
was no need for a balance sheet to understand the changing value of 
the SOE firm. Thus, even if there was a party interested in monitoring 
the firm, the measurement of performance and value on an enterprise 
basis would have been near impossible. 
Second, the sole provider of credit to significant SOEs was the state­
owned and controlled banking system (excepting direct cash allocations 
by government and planning authorities) .  In effect, banks were merely 
an alternative mechanism for planned allocations of capital by the state 
directly to SO Es. The banking system itself, and the instruments of that 
system, were equally unconcerned with profitability, efficiency or return 
on assets. As a result, there was no inquiry by these credit providers as to 
the creditworthiness or profitability of the "borrower" SO Es, and scant 
concern or expectation that such borrowers would pay interest or even 
principal. In this context, the state banking system had little incentive to 
monitor SO Es (or their managers' ) performance. These difficulties were 
only intensified by the lack of any hard budget constraint at the SOE 
enterprise level, even a notional bankruptcy threat, or a legal structure 
for security interests and exercise of the same by the providers of credit. 
In short, under the pre-reform structure, even the providers of credit to 
productive SOEs had no monitoring interest or incentive whatsoever. 
Thus, the historical SOE system was characterized by an absence of 
any monitors of enterprise profitability, much less methods to assess the 
performance of those individuals entrusted with operating the SOEs. 
Instead, performance evaluation focused on conformity with top-down 
bureaucratic commands, with little or no connection to the most effi­
cient or productive utilization of state assets. Indeed, performance 
evaluations for SOEs may well be termed almost entirely political 
(or bureaucratic) and opaque to any external actors. 
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After the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the 
death of Mao Zedong in 1 976 it was widely recognized that the SOE 
system, in large part because there was no effective monitoring, furthered 
widespread inefficiency, low factor productivity, and wastage in key 
capital intensive industrial sectors.48 Accordingly, and starting in the late 
1970s, China began far-reaching policy reforms of the SOE system to 
attack widely acknowledged SOE inefficiency.49 In particular, the PRC 
allowed substantial liberalization of so-called "collective enterprises" (not 
SO Es) and permitted the establishment of foreign-invested enterprises 
primarily project-specific joint ventures between inefficient SOEs and 
foreign investors matching cheap labor with foreign capital and techno­
logy to produce exported consumer goods.50 Moreover, for SOEs, new 
measures were implemented that provided key managers with personal 
incentives to be concerned with SOE asset productivity, and provided 
48 Nicholas R. Lardy, China's Unfinished Economic Revolution (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 1998). 
49 See Stoyan Tenev and Chunlin Zhang, with Loup Brefort, Corporate Governance and 
Enterprise Reform in China: Building the Institutions of Modern Markets (Washington DC: 
World Bank; International Finance Corporation, 2002), pp. 10-16; Naughton, Growing 
Out of the Plan, pp. 57- 170; Lardy, China's Unfinished Economic Revolution, pp. 2 1-58. 
Some of these policy reforms were subsequently codified in what was presented as " law;' 
as the PRC's parallel "legal construction" program gathered steam and substance. 
50 There were smaller scale enterprises (collectively owned enterprises and some truly 
"privately" -owned enterprises) in some areas. "Collectively owned" refers to the idea 
that these were "owned" by a local level collective - often a local-level government body 
and employee workers - and not fully nationalized or state-owned, at least not by central 
state authorities. However, this formal "ownership" by the collective did not imply any 
kind of governance power over the collectively held assets, or profit participation in the 
collective's revenues, made clear only in subsequent laws applicable to such collectively 
owned entities. In fact, many of the successful collectives were corporatized after the 
J 994 Company Law was passed, as much to get governance and profit-sharing benefits as 
to prepare for public listings. Chinese-foreign joint ventures allowed SOEs to contribute 
state-owned assets already entrusted to the SOEs into new, independent, "legal persons" 
(these foreign-invested enterprises became China's first post-1949 corporate entities) .  It  
has become clear that these Chinese-foreign joint ventures contributed mightily to 
fueling China's exploding export sector. But at least one study suggests that the initial 
program of attracting direct foreign investment had detrimental effects because it kept 
bankrupt SOEs afloat and diverted foreign capital investment away from more efficient 
and entrepreneurial, but less politically favored, enterprises. See Yasheng Huang, Selling 
China: Foreign Direct Investment During the Reform Era (Cambridge University Press, 
2003) .  Finally, SOEs could also at this time re-position state-owned assets under "joint 
enterprises" (lianying qiye), which were permitted to operate more autonomously than 
SOEs. These gained a formal basis in law only with the General Principles of the Civil 
Law 1986. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Min fa Tongze (The General Principles of the 
Civil Law of the People's Republic of China), Articles 5 1-3. 
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institutional incentives to force the SOEs themselves to operate more 
efficiently by tying the amount of resources the SO Es could retain at the 
enterprise level (or not submit to the government directly) to their 
economic performance.51 Thus, the "better" the SOE performed, the 
more cash assets (as retainable revenues) it could maintain under its 
control something of considerable benefit to the SOE and SOE manage­
ment. Although not quite the same as a profit mechanism, this key reform 
was designed to provide enterprise management with incentives to boost 
performance at the SOE level. 
At the same time, there were very early stage changes to the banking 
system,52 whereby banks were made notionally more credit-oriented in 
continuing to dole out planned capital allocations in the form of "bank 
loans." Moreover, 1986 saw the promulgation of an "experimental" Bank­
ruptcy Law applicable only to SO Es. This was an important (future) marker 
for the legal consequences and creditor's rights arising after the imposition 
of a real hard budget constraint on enterprises. Although important from 
the perspective of putting these issues on the table, these developments had 
little real bite as there was - in these early days - no true hard budget 
constraint at the enterprise level, a notional bankruptcy constraint which 
was rarely applied, and bank loans distributed according to political signals 
rather than credit signals, even by purportedly "commercial" lenders. 
By the end of this initial - primarily policy-based - period of reform, 
enterprise governance had improved somewhat as SOE management had 
slightly better internal incentives to operate more efficiently. However, 
the system still left very much to be desired in terms of external moni­
toring of PRC firms - the kind of external firm monitoring needed to 
significantly enhance efficiency. 53 
51 This included the use of dual track pricing (designed to introduce market incentives and 
re-orient SOE production) and liberalization of the labor markets thereby allowing for 
the possibility of dismissing certain workers. 
52 The People's Bank of China, China's sole domestic lender, spawned three new banks -
People's Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank, and Agricultural Bank of 
China - to exist alongside China's pre-Liberation foreign exchange banking institution, 
the Bank of China. for a more detailed treatment of the full banking reform agenda, 
from the mid- I 980s to 2009, see Howson, "China's restructured commercial banks." 
53 Chinese policy makers apparently sincerely believed that net changes in the way SOEs 
were managed - when matched with increased marketization of the external economy 
within which such firms acted - would lead to corresponding productivity and efficiency 
gains from the SOEs themselves. Notwithstanding a great deal of rhetoric, policy 
pronouncements, and promulgation (if not implementation) of "laws" and "regulations" 
and other "normative documents," many of the external and internal incentives (or 
disincentives) shaping enterprise performance remained very weak. 
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It is also important to note that these changes were not implemented 
(i) through formal corporatization of the firms or (ii) under law. This 
policy-inspired reform approach can be seen clearly in the PRC Law on 
Enterprises Owned by All of The People (SOE Law) .54 That "law" is in 
fact a catalogue of reform policy choices and aspirations rather than an 
enforceable statute. 5 5  
B. Formal reorganization of the industrial economy 
and corporatization (from early/middle 1980s to date) 
Formal corporatization of Chinese assets really began in the early 1 980s, 
as part of self-declared "experimental" programs undertaken at local 
(sub-national) level government initiative.56 In large part, these efforts 
were directed at the corporatization of (or in the accepted Chinese 
idiom, use of the "share system" (gufenzhi) by) smaller, and locally 
promoted, collectively owned enterprises. As an example, local govern­
ments made a practice of foregoing collection of an array of fees or taxes 
from pre-existing collectives, either for a recognized profit participation 
54 Quanminsuoyouzhi Gongyeqiye Fa (Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned by All of the 
People), adopted at the First Session of the Seventh National People's Congress and 
promulgated by Order No. 3 of the President of the PRC on April 13, 1 988, and effective 
on August l, 1 988. 
55 Thus, while the SOE Law does provide one of the initial confirmations, in law, of legal 
personality, hard( er) budget constraints, and independent accounting for SOEs, the SOE 
Law is really only a strong policy statement dressed up as a "law" designed to express the 
increased responsibilities and powers of factory/SOE managers, and the uneasy balance 
between state planned activity and the productive ambitions of SOEs themselves. 
Article 2 of the SOE Law says it quite well: 
[the SOE is] a socialist commodity production and operation unit that 
shall, in accordance with law, make its own management decisions, take 
full responsibility for its profits and losses, and practice independent 
accounting. The property of the enterprise shall be operated and managed 
by the enterprise with the authorization of the state in line with the 
principle of separation of ownership and management authority. The 
enterprise shall enjoy the right to possess, utilize and dispose of, according 
to the law, the property that the state has authorized it to operate and 
manage. 
Perhaps the most interesting question about the promulgation of the SOE Law pertains 
to why the Chinese government saw the need to promulgate it. Was it merely something 
deemed consistent with the appearance of the legal construction program then moving 
into high gear, or was it a political/institutional marker to establish basic, and presum­
ably irreversible, policy choices for all actors in Chinese society? 
56 These initiatives were undertaken first without any basis in national law or local-level or 
administrative regulation. 
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in the collective's future earnings, or something like "founders equity" in 
a formally re-organized, or even subsequently corporatized, collective.57 
In those very early days, one of the primary perceived benefits of 
corporatization - at this very local level was the relatively painless 
and cost-free creation of non-transferable "equity" interests in China­
domiciled firms, which were used ( oppressively in some cases) in lieu of 
unavailable cash compensation for employees. 
The great impetus for wide-scale corporatization of China's SOEs 
and eventually transformed collectively owned enterprises was capital­
raising. As early as 1 984, eleven SOEs became "shareholding system 
enterprises;' with a number of other corporatizations of SO Es completed 
before the end of that decade. 58 The almost premature establishment of 
Chinese stock exchanges at Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1990-1 ,  and the 
speculative frenzies resulting immediately, only heightened the attractive 
pull of the corporatization idea. 59 Above all, corporatization reform 
at this stage was animated by what must have appeared to be an easy 
bargain for Chinese enterprises and their bureaucratic (central or local) 
masters: the ability to attract financing ( Chinese and, almost immedi­
ately, foreign)60 for poorly performing SO Es, but without any dilution of 
the state's near absolute control in the resulting corporate entities.6 1 That 
being said, it is also clear that many reformist policy makers in China 
understood corporatization and the listing of shares on public 
exchanges - domestic or foreign - as a useful first step to increased 
monitoring of Chinese enterprises by public markets (both via market 
valuation and participation by shareholders in governance) ,  even if that 
would come at some time in the very distant future. 
In November 1993, the Chinese Communist Party officially 
unveiled and provided political sanction for the "modern enterprise 
57 See, eg., background to the formation of Stone, China Legend (now "Lenovo") ,  Hai' er, 
etc. 
58 See Tenev and Zhang with Brefort, Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform, p. 16. 
59 The frenzies, and in one August 1992 case surrounding the distribution of subscription 
forms for the Shenzhen Development Bank where riots resulted, led directly to the 
creation of China's powerful securities regulator, the China Securities Regulatory Com­
mission (CSRC). 
60 We note that the first public offerings on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
were for the equity in transformed Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures ("transformed 
into what?" lawyers might ask in the absence of a company statute) and directed to 
foreign purchasers of "B" shares. 
61 The fact that many participants saw the bargain as "easy" in the late 1 980s and early 
1990s does not refute the reality of the Faustian bargain struck in fact, as real governance 
constraints began to bite ten to fifteen years later. 
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system."62 This signaled the introduction and acceptance into China of  
the corporate mechanism and its attendant structural (legal ) ,  governance 
and management norms. Perhaps most i mportant in the PRC context 
was the acceptance by the ruling Party of separation of the state's 
continued ownership rights (in the corporate legal person) on one hand, 
and the corporate legal person's exercise of ownership rights over the 
assets it now "owned," on the other. This political (note, not yet legal) 
pronouncement was the culminating policy-ideological expression of  
the long effort to  maintain state "ownership" of  the means of  produc­
tion, while at the same time creating real incentives for management 
autonomy (and property rights) at the enterprise level.63 
Although a considerable move forward, the declaration of the age of  
"modern enterprise" in China did not enhance the governance situation 
at firms appreciably. The state remained the largest shareholder (in the 
70-80% range) and was still essentially "absent" as a shareholder inter­
ested in enterprise profitability. That "absent" but formal shareholder 
was also still far distant from insider (cadre) managers who more often 
than not fell prey to the temptations of opportunistic behavior with 
regard to the corporate assets left in their charge. Credit providers 
remained state-owned and run by Communist Party cadres, and were 
often captured by local-level government-dominated branches with 
interests closely aligned to the same local level government insider 
managers. Finally, even as China's "legal construction" program con­
tinued apace, there was little corporate or securities law designed to 
protect the interests and monitoring rights of those who provided real 
capital, and the weak courts did not have the competence, political 
strength or will to enforce what law and regulation there was. 
C. Company law and China (1993-2006) 
In 1 993, in line with the simultaneous policy confirmation of the 
"modern enterprise system," China's legislature promulgated China's 
first, and deeply flawed, post-Revolution Company Law - which law 
62 See Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, 
"Decision on Issues Concerning The Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic 
Structure." 
63 This same Decision from the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Congress also 
ratified, and made ideologically "safe;' a development already far advanced the rise 
of so-called "diversified forms of enterprise ownership": individually owned, privately 
owned and foreign-owned enterprises. 
540 NICHOLAS CALCINA HOWSON AND VIKRAMADITYA S. KHANNA 
became effective on July 1 ,  1 994.64 That law (along with China's Secur­
ities Law 1 999) was subject to wholesale and rather significant amend­
ments in late 2005, which came into effect on January 1 ,  2006. Yet, even 
with the 2005 amendment of these basic statutes, the corpus of corporate 
or company law in China today is by no means limited to a single statute 
which is called the "Company Law" or, with respect to listed companies, 
the "Securities Law." A great deal of China's corporate law-making and 
regulation, and many would argue corporate law that is more readily 
enforced, is found elsewhere. The great source of this regulation in 
modern China is the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
the administrative agency specifically charged with governing public 
(listed) company activity and all securities trading. 
Since 1 994, China's central government, the legislature, and the CSRC 
have accepted - with some pronounced and rather awkward exceptions -
the rhetoric of the "standard shareholder-oriented" model of corporate 
law and governance.65 At the same time, it was quite clear that until 2005 
64 The history of corporate law in China actually stretches a full ninety years before the 
enactment of the 1994 Company Law: on January 21 ,  1904, the then newly created Ministry 
of Commerce under the declining Manchu Qing Dynasty promulgated a Company Law 
( Gongsilu). See Wellington K. K. Chan, Merchants, Mandarins and Modern Enterprise in Late 
Ch'ing China (Cambridge MA: East Asian Research Center; Harvard University Press, 1977). 
Chinese scholars trace the first corporate (albeit experimental) establishment to 1873, with the 
promotion of the Lunchuan Zhaoshangju (China Steam Merchants Company) and some go 
even farther back in time to the 1 700s and invoke the formation of Sichuan's "contracting 
stock system" ( qiyue gufenzhi) enterprises and their essential corporate characteristics. See 
Jiusong Peng, Zhongguo Qiyue Gufenshi (China's Contracting Stock System) ( 1994). China's 
efforts at company law between 1904 and 1 948 were directed towards several clear aims: 
creating a tool for China's industrial development (especially in competition with foreign 
companies mal(ing their presence increasingly felt on Chinese soil); attaining perceived 
"Western" or "modern'' standards oflaw (with the hope that this would lead to the abolition 
of "extraterritoriality" imposed upon China after the Opium Wars); and, perhaps most 
importantly, but never explicitly, strengthening central government power. See William 
C. Kirby, "China unincorporated: Company law and business enterprise in twentieth century 
China'' ( 1 995) 54( 1 )  Journal of Asian Studies 43. Many of the same things motivate the 
creation and implementation of a corporate law for China in the present age. On the US and 
UK influence, and the use of "modern" corporate law as the price of winning freedom from 
the burden of "extraterritoriality;' see Lanxin Xiang, Recasting the Imperial Far East: Britain 
and America in China, 1945-1950 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995) .  
65 This suggests a high degree of forn1a] convergence. See Henry Hansmann and Reinier 
H. Kraakman, "The end of history for corporate law" (200 1 ) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 
439. At the same time, PRC corporate law evidences some continuing loyalty to other 
models, including the "manager-oriented" and "state-oriented" models (conflated into 
one) or the "labor-oriented" modeL For instance, a separate and inconsistent chapter 
was inserted into the Company Law to address a sub-species of the limited liability 
company form: the so-called "wholly state-owned company" (guoyou duzi gongsi): state 
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various institutions in China were not deemed sufficiently ready to bear 
the full burden of corporate law duties and adjudication.66 Indeed, as 
Black and Kraakman note about emerging markets generally, and which 
is wholly applicable to China even thirty years after the start of "legal 
construction": " [a] company law that depends on fast and reliable 
judicial decisions is simply out of the question."67 So it was that the 
Chinese corporate and securities law system - at least in form - initially 
had many features of the "self-enforcing" model, including enforcement 
of norms by voting rules and transactional rights granted to direct 
participants, reliance on procedural protections and even pr,ohibitions 
of disfavored transactions, attempts to invoke bright-line rules, a rhet­
oric (if not always the reality) that privileges the protection of "minority 
shareholders;' and some expression of legal remedies (administrative 
and criminal) in formal law and regulation. Notwithstanding the under­
standable initial orientation toward a "self-enforcing" system, Chinese 
law academics, drafters and officials have focused more recent efforts 
in the service of corporate governance mechanisms requiring ex post 
judicial interpretation (e.g., fiduciary duties, piercing the corporate 
veil, derivative actions, etc. ) ,  as expressed in the 2005 Company Law 
effective January 1, 2006,68 while maintaining a good number of  
administrative department-invested and -established legal person entities, which have no 
shareholders' meeting, but which do have boards of directors which delegate manage­
ment to an executive group. There seems little doubt that this section was inserted into 
the Company Law as a sop to certain political and economic actors in China who saw 
corporatization as the prelude to real privatization. Fealty to the European style of 
"labor-oriented" corporate entities is  revealed in China's corporate structures wherein 
a "supervisory board" is required of such companies. The truth in today's China is, 
however, that such supervisory boards are established in formal terms, but ignored or  
misunderstood over the life of the company. 
66 See Chunying Xin> (What kind of judicial power does China needt (2003) 1 ( 1 )  Inter­
national Journal of Consititutional Law 58; Randall Pcerenboom, China's Long March 
Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2002) ,  Chapter VII; Donald C. Clarke, 
"Power and politics in the Chinese court system: The enforcement of civil judgments" 
( 1 996) 10 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 1 .  
6 7  See Bernard S. Black and Reinier H. Kraakman, "A self-enforcing model of  corporate 
law" ( 1 996) 109 Harvard Law Review 191 1 .  Black and Kraakman include the 1994 PRC 
Company Law in their chart Survey of Company Law in Emerging Markets at the end of 
the article, with China deservedly scoring well from a purely formal standpoint. 
68 For one recent study which indicates pre-2005 convergence over ex post corporate gover­
nance mechanisms by China's much-maligned courts - at least with respect to traditional 
Anglo-American fiduciary duties. See Nicholas Calcina Howson "The doctrine that dared 
not speak its name: Anglo-American fiduciary duties in China's 2005 company law and case 
law intimations of prior convergence," in H. Kanda, K. Kim and C. Milhaupt (eds . ) ,  
Transforming Corporate Governance in East Asia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). 
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self-enforcing mechanisms (mostly super-majority and recused 
shareholder votes) . 
D. Focus on corporate governance reform 
in China (late 1 990s to 2006) 
Even with the arrival of a new machine the corporate entity and 
attendant legal and regulatory norms, the varied and ingenious abuses 
or simple dysfunctions quickly seen at China's new corporations, 
especially those publicly listing a portion of their capital, almost beggar 
comprehensive description. As Stephen Green wrote in 2003 with respect 
to PRC companies listed on China's domestic stock exchanges: 
China's stock market, . . .  was not a vehicle for privatization: whenever 
companies were listed the state retained large controlling stakes. As a 
result, the market has evolved into a dysfunctional halfway house, where 
neither public officials nor private shareholders enjoy effective control 
over most listed firms, and few in management have incentives to help 
their firms create value . . .  The poor quality of listed companies is the 
cause of the market's most serious problems, and until corporate per­
formance and governance standards improve, there will be no significant 
improvement in the market as a whole.69 
Green echoes an observation that we make above: a significant problem 
for China's new companies is not that there is an oppressive principal 
shareholder (the state or local governments) , but that there is no princi­
pal, or an "absent principal." The formal owner of the corporatized firm 
(just like the "all the people" deemed owners of the predecessor SO Es) 
is too amorphous and attenuated to do anything but cede control to 
opportunistic, or just incompetent, insider managers.7° It takes no great 
imagination to understand some of the ways in which Chinese com­
panies have been misgoverned and abused by other actors in the new 
corporate scheme.71 Indeed, with the rise of the "modern enterprise 
system", public listings of firms, and widely reported abuses, a virtual 
69 Stephen Paul Green, China's Stock Market: A Guide to its Progress, Players and Prospects 
(London: Profile, 2003) ,  p. 1 18. 
70 See also Donald C. Clarke, "Corporate governance in China: An overview" (2003) 14 
China Economic Review 494. 
71 Examples abound and include: blatant self-dealing and overcompensation of insider 
managers; political interference in operations; disregard of minority shareholder inter­
ests and accounting problems. Moreover, due to the absent principal problem, some­
times even the controlling shareholder (the state or local government-backed 
shareholder) will cede effective control to either (i) large holders of "legal person shares" 
(farengu) (often local government or local level identities of present or former line 
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obsession about "corporate governance" (gongsi zhili) has arisen inside 
China among both the professionals, investors and analysts who seek 
to understand China's progress,72 and the retail "punters" who seem 
willing to participate in what prominent reformer Wu Jinglian has 
called "a casino." Although this obsession has focused, mistakenly we 
assert, on aspirations for traditional Berle and Means separation of 
ownership and management (and the remedying of related agency 
problems),73 the general movement has also been concerned with the 
growth, and overall health, of liquid and deep stock markets. 
Whether or not China's domestic stock markets are what Professor 
Wu decries as a "casino;' real and perceived weaknesses in the gover­
nance of China's listed companies have had a decidedly negative impact 
on the overall value of China's capital markets. Indeed, the result to 2005 
and then after Spring Festival 2008 appeared to be a nightmare vision 
that Bernie Black borrows from the insurance sector - a "death spiral," 
where information asymmetry and adverse selection "combine to drive 
almost all honest issuers out of the market, and . . .  drive share prices to 
zero."74 While Chinese stock prices have not been driven to "zero," and 
politically privileged issuers continue to seek listings or follow-on 
Ministries) ,  or ( i i )  politically qualified (or local-government backed) managers or 
insiders. 
72 It is important to note that this focus and enthusiasm pre-dated corporate governance 
scandals and headlines in North America and Europe, and was inspired by an active, 
reformist and very learned cadre of officials working at the CSRC in the periods 1992-5 
and then 1999-2003. The power and influence of these individuals, many trained in the 
United States and Commonwealth countries with experience at international law firms, 
global accountancies and banks, was very seriously compromised by revelations about 
Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Andersen, etc because these individuals had vouched for a 
securities regulation and corporate governance system based on US models. These 
failures, which occurred under the watch of the then-recommended public disclosure 
(and independent accountancy) system, were used by opposing political forces to 
remove those same officials from the commanding heights of China's corporate and 
securities regulatory structures. 
73 The focus has been almost entirely on (i) Chinese SOEs, most often once formal 
separation of ownership and management is effected and they are transformed into 
companies limited by shares under the PRC Company Law, and (ii) listed companies 
(regardless of where they list their stock), which are necessarily companies limited by 
shares. See Clarke, 'Corporate governance in China'. This focus is unfortunate because 
there are many governance issues for other legal and spontaneous forms as well as private 
(non-listed entities) .  See for instance, Dehua Tang (ed.), Qita Gongsi Zuzhi Xingshi Yu 
Gufen Hezuo Qiye Falu Shiwu (Legal Treatise on Other Firms of Corporate Organization 
and the Stock Cooperative Enterprise) ( 1 998), p. 2 19. 
74 Bernard S. Black, "The core institutions that support strong securities markets" (2000) 
55 Business Lawyer 7. 
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offerings, the trend over the past ten years (with the intermediate surge 
resulting from initial announcement of the "stock rights reallocation 
initiative" (guquan fenzhi) and rather blind foreign interest in public 
Chinese equities suddenly accessiable via a Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investor (QFII) program) has been volatile. This situation had made the 
Chinese domestic exchanges a potentially unattractive place to raise 
money, both for the large reformed SOEs, which are permitted to issue 
and list shares on such exchanges, and the smaller, sometimes truly 
private, entities which have not generally been allowed wide access to 
the same markets.75 
In recent years, along with revision of China's corporate and securities 
law statutes in 2006,76 the PRC has taken important steps to reform 
(rather than merely establish) corporate governance. For instance, the 
2006 Company Law finally establishes that companies limited by shares 
(gufenyouxianzeren gongsi) 77 possess the five basic features of Anglo­
American corporations, which are: (i) full legal personality for the firm, 
(ii) limited liability for shareholders; (iii) shared ownership in the firm 
by investors; (iv) formal separation between ownership and manage­
ment, with management being delegated by the owners (shareholders) to 
a board of directors, and then to a management group; and (v) transfer­
able share interests (transferability is a very complex question in the 
Chinese context; a multitude of restrictions work on the proposed 
transfer of share capital in China, listed or not, in most cases depending 
upon who or what owns and is seeking to transfer shares) . Numerous 
other legal and regulatory changes have been implemented in the same 
period, many of which are invoked below. Overall, the changes effected 
in the last half decade or so have led to (i) changes in the expectations 
(and hence demands) of investors, (ii) an increase in the efforts of the 
CSRC, and indirectly the courts and the media, to enhance governance, 
75 As a result, they are forced to rely upon foreign investment, bank intermediaries (which 
are undergoing their own liberalization), intra-gronp financing, or the insufficient drip 
of retained earnings. 
76 Some of the changes - not dealt with in depth here impact upon the symbolic or 
rhetorical nature of the Law. For instance, literally hundreds of allusions to the "state's" 
role in corporate formation, governance and business decision making has been washed 
out of the new law's text. 
77 The PRC Company Law allows for two basic corporate forms, both of which confer limited 
liability for shareholders: companies limited by shares (gufenyouxianzeren gongsi) and limited 
liability companies (youxian zeren gongsi). The former is similar to what in American 
parlance is called a joint stock company; the latter is more like a closed corporation or 
corporate partnership. 
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(iii ) greater, or more clearly specified, legal obligations on management 
and controlling shareholders, (iv) better access to court enforce­
ment of governance via permitted shareholder suit mechanisms, and 
( v) the potential for increased monitoring by credit-evaluating financial 
institution lenders. These changes suggest that we might begin to see 
greater monitoring by the primary credit and equity providers in China 
(due to their increasing presence and greater incentives than before) 
which, when supplemented by law that is technically better and poten­
tially greater enforcement, provides a more promising future for govern­
ance. We summarize only the most important steps below. 
1 .  Investor expectations 
Investor expectations in China have begun to change for a number of 
reasons. First, China continued to corporatize SOEs and collective enter­
prises or township and village enterprises (TVEs) .  The increasing issu­
ance of equity interests to the public and other independent and 
commercially concerned (if often local government-backed) entities 
has introduced new owner-shareholders who have had a very significant 
impact on the way such enterprises are operated, and in whose interest. 
Second, and relatedly, corporatization of wholly domestic firms was 
preceded by the introduction of foreign equity investors in or alongside 
PRC enterprises. Indeed, this program commenced with private FDI 
from the first moments of China's Reform and Opening to the Outside 
World policy.78 Since the early 1990s, the PRC has pursued a very 
successful program to attract foreign investment to finance Chinese 
corporatized state-owned assets through both the private and public 
equity capital markets. Although this has been accomplished through a 
series of important (and often quite creative) moves,79 we will focus on 
78 This process also attracted early governance norms and pressures, not to mention more 
profound and significant notions of contract, enforcement of contract and law, and 
property rights holders' "rights." 
79 The "public" and offshore side of this was achieved in four ways. Firsl, China-domiciled 
issuers offered shares in newly corporatized entities to foreign, public, investors - starting 
with "H" (for Hong Kong) share offerings. For example, Shanghai Petrochemical's 'TI" 
shares IPO in 1 993. This was followed by expanding to "N" (for New York) share 
offerings ( Shandong Huaneng Power Development Company completed an initial pnblic 
offering of ADSs on the New York Stock Exchange in Augnst 1 994) ,  'T' (for London) 
share, "S" (for Singapore) shares, and so on. Second, and following from this, were the 
so-called "indirect" overseas listings, whereby PRC-dominated issuers were domiciled in 
Hong Kong or other offshore jurisdictions and issued shares on foreign markets. For 
example, China Telecom (which became China Mobile), CNOOC, etc., - which have 
issuers that are Hong Kong companies, issuing shares in the foreign (or Hong Kong) 
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the net effects of these efforts. The biggest effect was to induce foreign 
venture capital, private equity, retail and institutional shareholders to 
invest in PRC-domiciled or PRC-controlled foreign (including Hong 
Kong and foreign tax haven-domiciled) firms. 
In order to attract foreign, public equity, investors the PRC made a 
series of statutory, regulatory and governance changes to serve the 
perceived specific interests of foreign shareholders. These ranged from 
special statutes applicable only to foreign-invested or PRC-domiciled 
issuers listing overseas, to mandatory corporate constitutions for over­
seas-listing entities which introduced shareholder-friendly minority 
voting or class rights into Chinese law. As noted below, many of these 
items were later picked up and made applicable to all Chinese companies 
and purely Chinese public shareholders. In addition, so-called overseas 
listings brought Chinese issuers (and their shareholders, governing 
departments and advisers) into close contact with foreign legal and 
regulatory regimes whether it was Hong Kong, New York or London. 
Thus, the introduction of foreign capital not only effected indigenous legal 
change - and brought about the first encounter with sophisticated and 
highly regulated foreign regimes - but also made foreign investors active in 
Chinese companies of every stripe, bringing along with that participation 
their more sophisticated governance expectations. 
2. Regulatory efforts
Although the PRC legislature has made changes reflected in so-called 
"basic" laws - like the Company Law and the Securities Law - the CSRC 
has been the undisputed leader in reforming corporate governance more 
broadly. These reforms have conformed with the CSRC's authority to 
regulate the public markets and Chinese exchanges, and thus their work 
has concentrated on the corporatized SOEs permitted to list in China or 
abroad, and the kind of Chinese company which we identify above as the 
focus of China's corporate governance obsession. The efforts of the 
CSRC have gone some way in bringing governance to the fore and 
capital markets after taking title to in-country PRC assets. Third, foreign investment was 
permitted in the previously walled-off "/\' share markets (RMB yuan denominated 
shares traded among PRC citizen retail investors through China's domestic exchanges) 
via a Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program. Finally, foreign, private 
"strategic" investment (with board designations accompanying) was permitted alongside 
foreign public investment, explicitly so as to introduce strong, and relatively concen­
trated foreign shareholder participation in business decision-making and internal firm 
governance. 
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providing benchmarks against which investors and firms can measure 
themselves. This, in and of itself, is invaluable. 
For example, the CSRC has: promulgated a coherent statement of Cor­
porate Governance Principles; "recommended" (but in reality mandated) 
articles of association for purely domestic issuers with important elabo­
rations of corporate governance; mandated a compulsory independent 
director system (requiring listed company boards to have at least a one­
third "independent" board); established a veto right for "public sharehold­
ers" with respect to certain significant transactions (later incorporated into 
the amended Company and Securities Laws) ;  issued rules requiring <l;pproval 
by disinterested persons for certain transactions; and set out qualifications 
for who could serve as a director of a Chinese company. 
In addition, the CSRC has worked to increase the amount and rele­
vance of mandatory disclosure by PRC companies seeking capital on the 
Chinese domestic markets. This served to not only make markets more 
transparent for shareholders, but also provided additional information 
for China's muckracking financial media, which revels in its relative 
freedom to expose continuing governance difficulties or fraud. And the 
CSRC has had a significant role in creating rules and transactional 
imperatives for public company mergers and acquisitions, going some 
way to creating a necessary market for corporate control in China, with 
attendant governance and monitoring benefits. 
Finally, the CSRC has built an impressive and sophisticated enforce­
ment bureaucracy which maintains some objectivity because the CSRC 
(and its local departments) are independently, and centrally, funded. 
(China started regulating its embryonic exchanges and securities trading 
via local branches of the central bank, the People's Bank of China, which 
were quickly co-opted by local powers or proved technically incompe­
tent.) No doubt, the CSRC does not have the massive resources required 
to monitor corporate activity through China's vast hinterland. This is 
one reason why the CSRC above all other departments has pushed the 
private right of action for shareholders in China's courts so strongly. 
However, the enforcement function has performed admirably in the 
context of China's political, commercial and geographical context. 
In addition to the CSRC's efforts, several years ago China ended the 
long-standing "quota" system governing access to listings. Regional 
governments used to be given a "quota" of firms they could select to list 
on the Chinese exchanges or on overseas exchanges. This also meant that 
local governments would select affiliated firms for listing and bar other, 
often more entrepreneurial, firms from accessing capital. Now, however, 
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the opportunity to list may be available more broadly. These simple, if 
incremental, changes not only reduced the cronyism that persisted before, 
but also brought a new kind of corporation to the attention of public 
investors: issuers which did not have the support, or protection, of state 
or political actors, and who might seriously attend to profitability and 
performance to continue raising capital and appealing to the markets. 
This also would have further focused attention on firm profitability and 
how proclaimed and demonstrated governance might enhance it. 
3. Legal duties and obligations 
Not only has the mix of investors and the regulatory environment 
changed, so has the law. The radically amended Company and Securities 
Laws 2006 now provide, in the most explicit terms desirable, the following: 
(i) directors' and officers' fiduciary duties - including Anglo-American 
style duty of care and duty of loyalty; (ii) joint and several liability for 
directors, officers and supervisory board members for a broad range 
of violations or breaches of "law" (including the duties described in 
(i) above);  (iii) liability of "controlling shareholders" who abuse the 
corporate form, or prefer their own interests to the disadvantage of 
minority interests;80 and (iv) increased protection for minority share­
holders.81 Although many of these measures will need to rely on court 
enforcement (which is problematic due to lack of political power and 
experience with such matters) ,  they were in many cases absent from 
prior "basic" enactments and are critically useful continuing steps in 
enhancing governance. There is in fact evidence that the People's Courts 
have greater competence and political power in identifying and 
80 The heightened obligations include: greater disclosure requirements for controllers, new 
legal duties governing their actions, and liability for misdeeds nominally attributed to 
their dominated subsidiaries. It should be noted that the Company Law 2006 also 
introduces "veil piercing" protection for third parties dealing with PRC corporations. 
While not entirely workable in the short term (given the lack of sophistication and power 
of the judiciary), the mechanism stands as an additional warning to "tyrannical" 
controlling shareholders. In the context of this writing, this development is also of 
interest because it, once again, throws a good deal of work to the Chinese courts for 
articulation and resolution. 
81 Protection for minority shareholders now includes cumulative voting for the election of 
directors (Company Law 2006, Article 1 06) ,  the ability for 1 0% or more of the share­
holders to call a shareholders' meeting (Article 1 02)  or a board meeting (Article 1 1 1 ) ,  the 
ability of 3% or more of the shareholders to propose shareholders' resolutions (Article 
103),  mandatory shareholders meetings to approve large asset or external guaranty 
transactions (Article 1 05) (and supermajority approval for the same) (Article 122) ,  
and the ability of 1 0% or more of the shareholders to trigger liquidation (Article 83) .  
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enforcing against breaches of these key governance duties, even before 
the duties were finally set forth in law. 82 
Moreover, when this is coupled with the now completed effort to sell 
down the state's (or legal person's) interest in Chinese corporations which 
have publicly listed stock via the "stock rights allocation" (guquan fenzhi) 
program we can see important changes afoot. Indeed, the desire to rid 
the Chinese capital markets of a burdensome "overhang" of illiquid 
shareholdings (and thus move closer to market valuation) is only one of 
the purposes of this incremental sell-down. A perhaps equally important 
goal is to create the potential for improved governance at China's listed 
firms, and allow greater power or at least input for private (retail or 
institutional) shareholders when faced with unresponsive, conflicted or 
corrupt holders of non-tradeable shares. 
4. Enforcement 
The Company Law 2006 establishes the first private right of action for 
shareholders in Chinese companies to sue on a wide range of corporate 
malfeasance or breach of corporate law duties. Since China's Supreme 
People's Court - in response to CSRC, popular and media pressure -
first allowed a limited shareholders private right of action with respect to 
false or misleading securities disclosure in January and December 2002, 
this has been an issue of surpassing importance in China. Now, the 
Company Law 2006 provides a private right of action for shareholders to 
sue directors, officers and supervisory board members, directly or 
derivatively, and the Securities Law 2006 expands the class of potential 
defendants by creating joint and several liability for "controlling 
shareholders" or "actual control shareholders"83 where there is false or 
· misleading disclosure in issuance-related disclosure, or continuing 
disclosure and reporting. 84 Granted, the utility of these new rights of 
action remain unproven, as China awaits definitive rules from the court 
bureaucracy as to how litigants can actually bring such cases. However, 
as the creation of the all-important legal basis for private enforcement of 
corporate law and securities regulation, these new rights represent a huge 
step forward which will have much meaning in the decades to come. Of 
course, in the short to medium term, the crafting of these rights in law 
represents a keen challenge to the PRC court system, although one that is 
82 Howson, "The doctrine that dared not speak its name." 
83 Company Law 2006, Article 2 17. 
84 Securities Law 2006, Article 69 (amending the Securities Law 1999, Article 63) .  
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almost certain to be taken up over time under pressure from aggrieved 
owners of Chinese firms. 
5. Credit providers and bankruptcy constraints 
Finally, the context for external monitoring of firms by providers of credit is 
changing rapidly. There is a significant change under way in the way third 
party providers of credit China's commercial banks - are established, 
capitalized, corporatized, operated, and how they monitor the use of the 
capital they lend. Because of these changes it is most likely that banks - over 
time - will become far more effective monitors of Chinese corporate 
performance even as they become better monitored by their owners and 
the public markets generally. In formal terms, the bankruptcy or hard 
budget constraint on Chinese firm performance has been strengthened, with 
the promulgation of a PRC Bankruptcy Law, which greatly empowers and 
protects creditors at least in formal terms. As with the private right of action 
to sue for corporate law and disclosure breaches, it is still too early to 
understand how this new Law and its attendant monitoring powers 
will play out over time. However that unfolds, it is important to note once 
again the legal basis in Chinese law for this very significant and 
useful mechanism for the monitoring of Chinese firms into the future. 
The series of changes detailed above provide the seeds for the devel­
opment of improved and more effective corporate governance in China. 
We also note, importantly, that these changes have not come about in 
isolation, but in the context of rapid and impressive institutional change 
and reform which comprehends: deepening involvement by non-trade 
foreign investors (e.g., venture capital, private equity and institutional 
investors rather than multinational product investors) ;  an expanded 
and increasingly autonomous role for the courts (and better trained, 
less conflicted, politically more powerful personnel) ;  the rise of an 
independent bar; and a media that has obtained some significant free­
dom insofar as they limit their exhortations to the financial, commercial 
or economic sectors. These contextual changes are necessary if some of 
the corporate governance changes noted above are to become anything 
more than merely formal, or empty and unapplied, changes in law. 
E. What remains to be done in China (short term) 
The short-term requirements for China's continuing corporate gover­
nance reform seem obvious, but will be constrained given political, insti­
tutional and resource limitations. We enumerate here some of these 
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possible developments to further illuminate the scope of the challenge 
facing China's policy makers and legislators in the next decade. 
It perhaps goes without saying that China's legislation and regulation 
will need on-going substantive elaboration and clarity. To give one 
narrow but critically important example, while the new declarations of 
"duty of care" and "duty of loyalty" in Chinese company law are 
laudable, it is far from clear what those concepts really mean in China, 
how they can be reliably described, and whether or not they will be 
enforceable in any real way, or even actionable given parallel systems of 
regulation which might prohibit actions on breach of fiduciary. duties 
(as the Supreme People's Court presently asserts) .  
Consider another example. One option to solve the "absent principal" 
problem in Chinese firms controlled by state or state-delegated entities 
is to set up intermediate shareholding entities which are interested in, 
and operate, the enterprises they are invested in. In the financial sector, 
the PRC made headway in this regard by recapitalizing its technically 
insolvent SOE commercial banks via a new entity established by the 
Ministry of Finance and the PRC central bank and known as Huijin 
which became the dominant and controlling shareholder in China's 
commercial banks. Real personnel were suddenly involved in Huijin's 
monitoring of commercial banks and more importantly the often con­
flicted insider management at the same banks. (Huijin has since been 
absorbed into China's main sovereign wealth investor, China Investment 
Corporation (CIC) , and it is open to question whether CIC will with 
its far more diffuse investment portfolio in China and abroad - be able 
to match Huijin's record of close monitoring.) In the non-financial 
state assets sector, 2003 saw the establishment of something billed as 
a Huijin-like entity, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Admini­
stration Committee (SASAC).  However, the jury is still out on the 
extent to which the SASAC can and will act as a real principal, or 
whether its monitoring capacities will be overcome by the very large 
number of enterprises it now controls (as compared to the four com­
mercial banks controlled by Huijin) and it will revert to the status of 
another "absent" principal which has dominated the history of China 
SOE corporatizations. 
For external monitoring, it is clear that the commercial banking 
industry must continue to be reformed and modernized before it will 
be able to resist providing capital to Chinese firms on a political rather 
than commercial basis. In this regard, the agreement and implementa­
tion of a complete, and sophisticated, bankruptcy regime, and a court or  
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decisional system sophisticated enough to handle bankruptcy matters, 
is of signal importance. If ex post standards are to be applied to, and 
articulated for, the key actors in any governance inquiry, then the courts 
must find some way to increase their sophistication, political power, and 
enforcement capabilities prior to that part of the corporate governance 
system becoming workable. This is the great task of China's overall "legal 
construction" program. 
In the institutional sphere, and especially in the absence of a strong or 
competent judiciary, the CSRC must continue to be supported (finan­
cially and politically) so that it can continue its unique legislative, 
investigative and enforcement functions. Notwithstanding that reality, 
those concerned with institutional reform and empowerment must 
continue to pay close attention to procedural changes which - one 
day - will allow courts to be a viable instrument in the application 
and enforcement of a reforming corporate governance system. For 
instance, the Supreme People's Court will be required to accept the 
broad shareholders' (or company's) right of action set forth in the 
Company Law 2006. It remains to be seen if the Supreme People's Court 
will resist - by its own administrative rules and explanations (such as the 
Rules on Private Shareholders Suits for False or Misleading Disclosure of 
December 2002) - what is now plainly authorized in a national statute 
promulgated by the PRC legislature. Likewise, the PRC will need to 
come to terms with the notion of class action litigation coupled with 
lawyers' contingency fee arrangements. (Note that the problem in the 
PRC at this point is not too many frivolous suits, but too little monitor­
ing of the firm by shareholders and others as well as resource constraints 
on the CSRC limiting its ability to monitor on the shareholders' behalf.) 
However, the class action is relevant to the prosecution of actions in 
areas more sensitive than firm governance - i.e., land confiscations, labor 
unrest, environmental outrages, and official malfeasance in connection 
with health disasters. Accordingly, it may be some time before the 
Chinese authorities write into law a useful class action mechanism. 
V. Insights on corporate governance from China and India 
The accounts of the development of corporate governance reform in 
China and India may also provide insights on topical debates in corpo­
rate law scholarship. In particular, the experiences of China and India 
help us to examine how certain theories operate in the world's two 
largest emerging markets and fastest growing economies. 
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A. Stock market development and "legal origins" 
The question of h ow law might help to create better governed com­
panies and thereby develop stock markets has captured the imagination 
of the academy. In their now seminal articles, La Porta, La Silanes, 
Schleifer and Vishny find that countries with a common law legal 
system tend to have more developed stock markets than countries with 
a civil law legal system (the "legal origins" perspective) .  85 They suggest 
at least two reasons for this. First, they argue that the common law is 
more protective of property rights, specifically the interests of smaller 
shareholders, than a civil law system. This, they assert, is because the 
common law expects judges to use application of flexible fiduciary 
duties principles in regulating behavior whereas the civil law is more 
rigid. The greater latitude granted to judges permits them to police 
opportunistic behavior and outright fraud more effectively than civil 
law courts and this is something small investors (the likely victims of  
such fraud and opportunism) value. Consequently, one would expect 
to find that jurisdictions that are part of the common law system have 
more developed stock markets because the common law is more 
protective of small shareholders and this motivates and encourages 
small shareholders to participate in capital markets regulated in such 
jurisdictions. 
Another reason why "legal origins" may matter is that the civil law 
is said to over-regulate relative to the common law. This is impor­
tant because the lighter regulatory orientation of the common law is 
said to facilitate private ordering (i.e., market based transactions) 
whereas the civil law tends to discourage such private ordering because 
outcomes (or perhaps processes) are determined by regulation. The 
more private-ordering-friendly approach of the common law is 
85 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, "Legal 
determinants of external finance" ( 1997) 52 Journal of Finance 1 1 3 1 ;  Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, "Law and finance" 
( 1 998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 1 J 1 3. Later papers have suggested that common 
law systems tended to outperform civil law systems both in their countries of origin ( i.e., 
European civil law countries tended to perform worse than Anglo-American common 
law countries) and even in countries where they had adopted one of these approaches 
(i.e., the former German and French colonies performed worse on stock market develop­
ment compared to former English colonies). Further studies also suggested that it was 
securities laws in particular that seemed to make a substantial difference in the out­
comes. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, "What 
works in securities laws" (2006) 6 1 ( 1 )  Journal of Finance 1-32. 
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important because securities markets tend to thrive in such market-
£ . dl . 86 nen y environments. 
Although these papers have been highly influential, there has been 
considerable discussion of alternative views. In particular, a series of papers 
from both economists and legal academics suggest that "legal origin" is 
not the primary explanation for why we tend to see common law countries 
with better governed firms and thus more developed stock markets.87 
These other papers first suggest that the descriptions of common law 
and civil law oversimplify reality and that in many instances so-called 
common law countries have even more regulation bias than civil law 
countries.88 Indeed, both systems - as seen in developed economies -
seem quite adept at being able to use (or borrow) tools and techniques 
from the other. Second, these papers suggest that the growth of stock 
markets is better explained by three other factors. First, that there is 
demand for what stock markets can provide - external capital. This has 
tended to be the case when economic or technological changes require 
the aggregation of capital from many sources and there is no really good 
alternative to stock markets. Second, the institutions that support stock 
markets are in place or are being put in place by legislators or private 
ordering. Such institutions and practices include such staples as func­
tioning (and independent) courts, adequate disclosure requirements, 
and effective methods of containing self-dealing.89 Third, the general 
86 One might also interpret the "over-regulation" in the civil law as being regulation that 
benefits incumbents by making entry into domestic markets more difficult. This serves 
to weaken one of the other primary constraints on managers (and factors pushing 
toward better governance) - product market competition because when firms face less 
competition then the consequences of their inefficient governance choices take longer to 
be visited upon them. By weakening the impetus for better governance from the product 
markets, civil law might tend to reinforce inefficiencies in governance and thereby also be 
a less attractive place for small shareholders to invest. 
87 Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, "The great reversals: The politics of financial 
development in the twentieth century" (2003) 69 Journal of Financial Economics 5; Mark 
J. Roe, "Legal origins and stock markets in the twentieth century" (2006) 120(2) Harvard 
Law Review 460-527. Even some papers in the "legal origins" literature seem to suggest it 
is statutory securities laws ( rather than judicially enforced common law) that seems to 
spur stock market development. This suggests "legal origins" are not after all determina­
tive. See La Porta, et al., "What works in securities laws." 
88 Roe, "Legal origins and stock markets." 
89 Black, "The core institutions"; John C. Coffee, Jr., "The future as history: The prospects 
for global convergence in corporate governance and its implications" ( 1 998-9) 93 
Northwestern University Law Review 641 ;  John C. Coffee, Jr., "Racing towards the top?: 
The impact of cross-listings and stock market competition on international corporate 
governance" (2002) 1 02 Columbia Law Review 1 757. 
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political environment of a particular jurisdiction is deemed conducive 
to (or, at least, will not thwart) the growth of stock markets. 90 
Although the latter account summarized immediately above is more 
complex than the "legal origins" account, its adherents suggest that 
it better explains the actual development of stock markets over the last 
1 00 years or so. Indeed, it appears that the asserted connection between 
common law structures and stock market development is of relatively 
recent origin. In the early 1 900s civil law countries had at least as well 
developed, if not better developed, stock markets than common law 
countries. Moreover, in terms of stock market development, it was only 
after World War II that common law countries seemed to climb above 
civil law countries and even that trend seems somewhat short lived as the 
gap between civil and common law countries has diminished in recent 
times. This suggests, as Rajan and Zingales point out, that time-invariant 
structural explanations (e.g., "legal origins") cannot explain what we 
have seen over the last hundred years. 
The question then becomes: what does explain the experience with 
corporate governance and stock market development over the last 
hundred years? Although clearly the absence of certain critical insti­
tutions (e.g., functioning courts) would retard progress in improved 
corporate governance and developing stock markets, many commen­
tators focus on whether there is the political will to create responsibly 
governed corporate entities and develop healthy capital markets. The 
implicit (and sometimes explicit) assertion is that if there is the 
national political will then there is a political (and economic, legal 
and institutional) way. 
Rajan and Zingales suggest that, normally, incumbents will oppose 
stock market development because it provides easier access to capital 
for new entrants and hence enhances competition for those incumbent 
firms. However, incumbents may be willing to support such develop­
ment if they also need access to external capital to take advantage of 
perceived business opportunities and there is no other viable source of 
such external capital besides functioning securities markets. Thus, Rajan 
and Zingales suggest that stock markets may obtain popular support 
once incumbents also have a desire to access external capital. This is, of 
course, more likely in an expanding trade and investment environment, 
or when trade and investment is more open. Trade was indeed more 
90 Rajan and Zingales, "The great reversal"; Roe, "Legal origins and stock markets." 
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open before World War II and after the 1 980s, and that is precisely when 
we see stock markets growing in many different jurisdictions. 91 
Although trade policy is important, Roe suggests another important 
historical factor: that the economic and political devastation wrought on 
many countries by World War II may have led their polities to become less 
"friendly" to stock markets in the aftermath of such destruction. He 
argues that after World War II in Europe many nations had few resources, 
and the citizenry had few savings. In such an environment the polity is 
more likely to focus on labor rather than investment interests, as few 
people have any savings to invest. Moreover, in much of Europe there was 
an on-going political and ideological battle against the ideological and 
material attractions of Communism. In order to maintain the support of 
the citizenry for market-oriented economies, national legislatures may 
have tended to favor labor. The consequence for not doing so might have 
triggered political reversal and a move towards Communism. This, 
Roe suggests, provides a better explanation for why so many countries 
in Continental Europe adopted less shareholder-friendly laws and tended 
to favor labor in the early post-War years. Indeed, this provides a good 
explanation for why these countries may have been averse to free trade 
and preferred more "protectionist" policies. On the other hand, countries 
that were not as badly devastated in World War II and that were further 
away from the front-line ideological battle over Communism (the US, 
Switzerland, UK) were in a better position to support stock markets 
oriented away from labor and toward investors. The polity in these 
countries had relatively more savings and thus investment resources 
and, one might imagine, would have been keen to pursue investment 
policies and probably more open trade. Once the polities in Continental 
Europe had savings and investment capacity, a change in the approach to 
stock markets might be seen, with their becoming more favored.92 
Adherents to this account (we call it the "politics" account) suggest 
their explanations gel better with the experience of the last hundred years. 
91 Rajan and Zingalcs, "The great reversal." Rajan and Zingales do not fully reject the "legal 
origins" account. Rather they suggest that the "politics" account and the "origins" 
account may work together in some ways, In particular, they suggest that in the civil 
law, being more centralized than the common law, it may be easier for private interests to 
have their agenda enacted (they need only convince the legislature not courts and so 
forth). If so, then when the political will is present for change it may occur more quickly 
in civil law countries than common law. They find evidence of this in how quickly the 
civil law was able to slow down its stock markets and how quickly it was able to speed up 
the development of its stock markets later as compared to common law countries. 
92 Roe, "Legal Origins and Stock Markets." 
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The policy prescriptions emanating from this account are more 
contextual. In the case of a given country one would need to understand 
whether the polity was supportive of stock markets and then devise legal 
policy in light of that to help build the institutions needed for well 
functioning stock markets. If the polity was not supportive then wide­
spread reform could not proceed without first having measures to obtain 
support from the polity. 
Both the "legal origins" and "politics" accoupts provide predictions 
for what will lead to stock market development, but neither has been 
applied in significant detail to the experiences in either of the two largest 
emerging markets India and China. What does our discussion 
of corporate governance reform and the establishment of functioning 
capital markets in India and China suggest? 
On a quick glance the different experiences of India and China appear 
to provide some support to both accounts, but looks can be deceiving. 
First, let us examine the "legal origins" account. Most observers will 
understand India as a nation firmly in the common law tradition, and 
China in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries closer to a civil law 
jurisdiction. Further, the growth of India's stock markets over the long 
term has been more positive and less volatile than China's, even though 
China has, for much of the last twenty years, experienced a higher 
economic growth rate than India. This, on cursory inspection, provides 
some support to the "legal origins" account. However, one needs to look 
more closely before coming to firm conclusions. 
Although, India does have a common law system, for most of the 
period following independence ( 1947-9 1 )  it followed a socialist devel­
opment path with policies that significantly impeded the growth of its 
stock markets. Many people would have easily described India as being 
over-regulated (the "license raj" epithet comes to mind) ,93 which is one 
of the major supposed vices of the civil law. 
Moreover, the description provided in subsection III.B suggests that 
the background law - while apparently protective of small shareholders 
as it was based on English Law - was not, in reality, very protective o f  
smaller shareholders. India's judiciary, although independent and argu­
ably one of the most powerful in the world, did not appear to be active, 
93 See Tarun Khanna and Krishna Palepu "The evolution of concentrated ownership in 
India: Broad patterns and a history of the Indian software industry;' in Randall K. Morck 
(ed. ) ,  A History of Corporate Governance around the World (University of Chicago Press, 
2005) ,  pp. 283-324; Goswami, "India: The tide:' 
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prompt and flexible in protecting shareholders interests.94 Thus, India, 
while nominally a "common law" country, was performing like a civil 
law country on the dimensions that matter most under the "legal 
origins" account - protecting small shareholders and being less regulated 
than civil law. 
One might respond by saying that we should then categorize India as 
something closer to a civil law-family nation (although this is contrary 
to how the "legal origins" literature normally categorizes). But what then 
explains the considerably better performance of Indian stock markets 
over the long term? Perhaps the answer is that India is now adopting a 
more common law style in terms of protecting small investors and 
regulating less. This is only partially true. India is certainly protecting 
small investors more than it has before. However, it is not necessarily 
regulating less, it is just changing its domain of regulation away from a 
direct mechanism - licenses to enter business - to indirect regulation 
featuring mandated disclosure and corporate governance features. 
China's legal system is a different case because it partakes of different 
traditions or "origins" - all at the same time - in different sectors 
of application (e.g., Soviet and European civil law heritage in criminal 
law and procedure, German civil law (via Japan and Taiwan) in com­
mercial and contract law, and the Anglo-American tradition in recent 
corporate and securities law (with an occasional entanglement with 
an inflexible "business regulation" orientation) . Thus, divining a con­
nection between legal origin, corporate governance and stock market 
growth in China is not a straightforward exercise. In China's reform 
experience, corporatization and domestic exchanges were permitted first 
as a politically attractive and relatively costless method of financing 
state-owned (and controlled) assets95 and as a substitute for direct state 
allocations of capital. As a result, China's enactments cleaved very closely 
to a business regulation orientation, or one that enabled the creation of 
viable financing vehicles, with little regard for the rights and interests of 
94 See Debray, "Some issues in law reform in India"; C. D. Cunningham, "The world's most 
powerful court: Finding the roots of India's public interest litigation revolution in the 
Hussainara Khatoon prisoners case;' in S. P. Sathe and S. Narayan (eds. ) ,  Liberty, Equality 
and Justice: St ruggles for a New Social Order (Lucknow, India: Eastern Book Company, 2003 ), 
pp. 83-96; Susan Thomas, "How the financial sector in India was reformed;' in S. Narayan 
(ed.), Documenting Reforms: Case Studies from India (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2006) .  
9 5  Although China had some history with the corporate form from the end of the Qing Dynasty 
(to 1 9 1 1 ), and even domestic exchanges in the Shanghai International Concession and other 
places before World War II, the reappearance of these norms and institutions in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s was in the context of no related legal tradition. 
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minority shareholders. Indeed, China initially rejected the Anglo­
American model in formal terms. The current interest in protection of 
minority rights, and more broadly good corporate governance, has come 
from the sometimes bitter diet of fraud, oppression and opportunism 
forced onto such rights holders. This in turn has spurred concerns 
for political stability and the general viability, reputation and health 
of China's domestic capital markets. It is these concerns that have caused 
China's policy and lawmakers, and regulators, to look to the Anglo­
American models for a pre-packaged aid menu.96 
One can also examine the "politics" account. Recall that acco�ding to 
this account stock market development starts with demand for external 
capital, the presence of supportive institutions and the political will to 
have strong stock markets (which is less likely after a devastating war or 
when the country is having an ideological battle with Communism) .  
Here we obtain some greater traction. 
In the case of China it is fairly clear that by 1949, after the Anti­
Japanese War, World War II and the Chinese Civil War, its domestic 
economy was devastated. It seems unsurprising therefore that China's 
new Communist rulers would, apart from ideological reasons, imple­
ment a centralized, planned, and state-owned economy rhetorically 
committed to the interests of "labor" and protective against imperialist 
economic powers. This much seems consistent with the "politics" 
account. However, very serious disruption continued in China for quite 
some time - through the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Great Leap 
Forward and the start of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution -
until greater stability (and legitimacy for the Party) arose after the 
winding down of the most violent period of the Cultural Revolution in 
the late 1 970s. After this level of chaos one might have expected a greater 
96 The story behind the absorption of fiduciary duties into China's Company Law 2006 is 
illustrative of this: China's first national Company Law ( 1994) was very heavy on 
business regulation and aspirational commands; more importantly, the statute contained 
only very oblique references to what might be construed as fiduciary duties for directors, 
managers and supervisory board members. When queried on this, most Chinese aca­
demics, regulators and practitioners, justified the rejection of Anglo-American concepts 
with ringing calls about China's adherence to the Japanese (and incidentally Taiwanese) ,  
"Asian" and even "Confucian" traditions. Some o f  the abuses described, caused Chinese 
lawmakers to import, via direct translation, specific duties of care, loyalty and good faith 
into the Company Law 2006, even without any strong notion as to the viability of court 
articulation of enforcement of the same (and absolutely no thought that such courts 
were acting or would be acting in a "common" or "civil" law tradition) . See Howson, 
"The doctrine that dared not speak its name." 
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focus on labor, rather than capital. Somewhat surprisingly then, China's 
policy makers adopted a new strategy of economic revitalization 
(through experimental and ideologically incorrect marketization strat­
egies) and the attraction of foreign capital and trade. Moreover, when 
the demand for external capital became great enough we witnessed a 
thaw in the attitude towards some notions of property and enforceable 
rule of law. When that same interest in capital attraction - Chinese and 
foreign grew in the 1 980s, there became only increasing awareness of 
the need to protect shareholders interests so as to attract equity investors 
in newly corporatized Chinese entities, and then develop strong stock 
markets. This account seems somewhat conflicted from a "politics" 
perspective. Economic reconstruction and post-trauma social instability 
and a desire to favor capital. However, it seems clear that in China the 
ability to bring about economic growth (which required capital) was one 
of the critical elements the Party needed to maintain political power. 
Thus, here we see a polity interested in economic growth ( after a long 
period of economically poor performance) albeit to serve political 
ends - that led to reforms specifically designed to attract capital. 
The broader point is that the "politics" perspective - and in particular 
the changing political, reconstruction and stabilization needs of China 
over time - do seem to explain increasing awareness and implementa­
tion of new corporate governance solutions and the development of 
stock markets. In short, this might lead us to conclude that modem 
corporate governance reform in China is not only desired and delivered 
to serve investor expectations (and an ever more useful capital markets) ,  
but i s  "permitted" by a developing historical-political circumstance.97 
In the case of India, World War II did not wreak the same level of 
domestic devastation. However English colonial rule, the difficult pro­
cess of Independence and the tragedy of Partition of the Sub-Continent, 
among other things, seriously weakened the economic base within India. 
The effects of this devastation, although not identical to those of a war, 
likely had a somewhat similar effect on savings. Moreover, the political 
97 We should note that the Chinese system has not completely abandoned the rhetoric of 
the first solutions required by politics, history and ideology. This can be seen in the 
ongoing debate about the extent to which the law should protect private property or 
Socialist property, the real nervousness surrounding selling down the state's interest in 
newly corporatized entities, and "social" or "labor" model aspects of China's corporate 
statutes. (On the latter issue, we point to the quickly atrophying "supervisory board" 
mandated at Chinese companies now given a new lease on life under the Company Law 
2006 as the recipient of shareholders' demands in the event of proposed derivative suits.) 
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movement in India that led to the withdrawal/removal of the British Raj 
relied on obtaining something like consensus within India's vast and 
highly heterogenous population. This frequently involved the use of 
strikes and other measures that unified labor. This, one might imagine, 
led to the perception (accurate or not) that the polity was more favorable 
towards labor than capital. 
However, once there was liberalization, greater international trade, 
and competitive spaces opened up, the demand for external capital was 
high. Indeed, in India industry pushed for corporate governance reform 
in order to attract external capital. The response was as described in 
subsection III.C and was embodied in a rather quick reform' effort. 
This seems broadly consistent with the "politics" account: start with 
labor-oriented policies after a severe economic weakening and then as 
the economy grows and external capital becomes more attractive we see 
changes toward a more capital-friendly environment. 
The experiences of India and China, however, also suggest a 
broadening of the "politics" account. First, the experience of India 
suggests that it need not only be war that leads to a change (e.g. ,  
capital-friendly to labor-friendly) .  Any kind of  devastation of the econ­
omy (e.g., colonial policies) is likely to lead to such a change. Second, the 
experience of China suggests that change following devastation depends 
on what the status quo was before the change.98 In the case of most 
Continental European nations and India the devastation occurred under 
governments that were generally more market-friendly. In this situation 
the change was away from market-friendly to more labor-friendly pol­
icies. In China, however, the devastation culminated during the rule of a 
government that, in theory, favored labor and was actively hostile to 
capital investors. In this context, the final post-devastation approach ( if 
we see the devastation as something lasting to 1976 and the death of 
Mao) was the opposite - more capital-friendly. This suggests, tentatively, 
that the change around the time of devastation may not be simply 
towards labor, but depends on what kind of regime preceded the 
devastation, and, perhaps most importantly, the political goals of the 
post-devastation regime. 
98 In India one might view the 1 991 financial crisis as the turning point for reforms. 
Although no doubt true, one can hardly describe the 1991  financial crisis as a "devasta­
tion." Moreover, India's growth post-Independence has not been stellar, but it can hardly 
be described as being analogous to what happened in China between the mid-1930s and 
the late 1970s. 
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B. Convergence and to what? 
Another important and related debate in corporate law academia is 
whether corporate law will eventually converge onto a particular model 
(e.g., the Anglo-American model based on dispersed ownership, the 
separation of ownership and control, application of flexible legal stand­
ards ex post) . Views differ considerably on whether convergence is likely 
to happen and, if it does, whether it will be formal convergence (the laws 
look very similar) or functional convergence (the laws are different but 
achieve the same functions) or some intermediate point. 
The formal convergence argument was most recently articulated by 
Hansmann and Kraakman where they argue that formal convergence is 
likely (or already happening) because (i) the shareholder primacy view of 
corporate law (i.e., managers owe duties to maximize shareholder wealth) 
has trumped other views, (ii) the competition of the global market place -
in particular the global competition for capital, but also product markets 
competition - will lead firms and nations to choose the Anglo-American 
model of corporate governance, and (iii) that there is now a shift of 
interest groups in favor of an emerging class of shareholders. Although 
all three parts are important to the formal convergence argument, many 
commentators have focused on prong (iv) because of the perception that 
competition in the product and capital markets will force firms with 
different governance structures to compete with each other.99 
The implication is that Darwinian competition will lead to the success 
of the Anglo-American model as it is more suited to capital-raising than 
other models, and because access to capital may be a significant factor 
in obtaining success in product and other markets. This is especially 
significant for newer firms and industries, not to mention new entrants 
from emerging markets. Moreover, as the speed of innovation increases 
we might expect the newer firms to become more important and 
dominant in each country. 
99 There is debate over whether the shareholder primacy account has truly won out. See 
Lynn Stout, "Bad and not-so-bad arguments for shareholder primacy" (2002) 85 
Southern California Law Review 1 189; Kraakman and Hansmann. "The end of history 
for corporate law". However, for purposes of analysis we assume that it has won out to 
examine how competition in product and capital markets might influence the selection 
of corporate laws and institutions. Further, the interest groups supporting the share­
holder class are interesting because often these groups are pension plans and unions 
which represent labor. Labor and capital are then interlinked, rather than opposing, 
forces in this account. 
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The primary alternative to the formal convergence account is the 
"path dependent" account. Under this view, corporate laws are much 
less likely to converge onto a single model because aspects like ownership 
structure and corporate rules are much less amenable to change than one 
might think. Bebchuk and Roe argue that rules can be path dependent 
for both efficiency reasons, as well as rent-seeking ( i.e. ,  inefficient) 
100 reasons. 
Rules can be efficiently path dependent because the background 
institutional structure may be too costly to change and hence only 
some rules (i .e. , the path dependent ones) are worth pursuing. If so, 
then the fact that the rules are not the same as the Anglo-American 
model may not be inefficient given the costs of institutional change in a 
particular country. Rules can also be inefficiently path dependent 
because parties who benefit (i .e. , incumbents) under the pre-existing 
structure may lobby effectively to block change, even when it is efficient 
overall, because it reduces their gains. Such rent-seeking may lead 
to inefficient and path dependent results. Regardless of the source of  
path dependent rules, their presence (and the difficulty and cost of 
changing the background institutional structure) is  likely to impede 
convergence. 
Of course, neither side is suggesting clearly defined outcomes. The 
path dependency advocates would probably accept that if the advantages 
of change are sufficiently (and perhaps overwhelmingly) large then even 
the costs associated with change can be overcome. Further, the conver­
gence advocates do not predict that governance rules will converge 
overnight. Thus, one could view the convergence and path dependent 
camps as occupying two points on a continuum assessing how fast, and 
how much, change might occur: the convergence advocates would sug­
gest quickly and the path dependent advocates would suggest slowly, if at 
all. Moreover, if convergence will take time then it is possible that even 
the countries currently using the Anglo-American model may not be  
using i t  in fifty years (e.g. , serious economic downturn in  that country 
leading to the adoption of more socialist policies) .  Thus, by the time one 
country has adopted the Anglo-American model it is possible that 
countries that used to employ it do not any more - making it difficult 
to describe this process as convergence. The critical matter then is  
whether the forces for convergence (e.g., product and capital market 
100 Lucian A. Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, "A theory of path dependence in corporate 
ownership and governance" ( 1999) 52 Stanford Law Review 127. 
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competition) will move quickly enough to overcome the forces of path 
dependency (e.g., entrenched interests and institutions, high costs asso­
ciated with change) .  
Finally, some have suggested intermediate accounts of legal change in 
the corporate arena. Gilson suggests that corporate law rules may tend 
towards functional convergence rather than formal convergence. The 
competitive forces that make the Anglo-American model attractive 
may lead many firms and countries to want the advantages this brings 
( e.g., more capital, better products) ,  but the cost to changing all the 
institutions may be too high or take too long.10 t So instead of changing 
all institutions to mimic the Anglo-American model, countries and firms 
may make changes that have the same effects as the Anglo-American 
model (e.g., protecting minority shareholders, enhanced disclosure), but 
in form are still similar to the pre-existing rules which were not in 
conformity with the Anglo-American model. This provides, Gilson 
argues, most of the benefits of the Anglo-American model while not 
implicating the huge costs of formal change. This might be termed the 
"path of least resistance" or "path of greatest convenience" approach. 
Coffee also suggests an intermediate account where a firm can speci­
fically enhance its capital raising abilities by simply listing on, and 
meeting the requirements of, a foreign securities exchange. 102 In some 
respects the firm is borrowing the apparently better disclosure, account­
ing and governance requirements of the foreign securities exchange to 
enhance its image in the eyes of potential investors, whether from the 
same country or abroad. Of course, this is a partial solution as some 
elements of the regulatory regime imposed by virtue of the foreign 
exchange listing may not be credible in the country from which the firm 
emanates. Nonetheless, such listings may help individual firms. 
In light of these differing theories on convergence, what can we learn 
by examining India and China? The experiences of India and China 
throw light on the issue of convergence because both countries face 
intense product and capital market competition ( sometimes with each 
other) , but they have long histories with strong interests and powerful, 
pre-existing, institutions. The countervailing forces - competition for 
convergence and institutional strength behind path dependence -
provide an interesting testing ground for the convergence debate. 
101 Ronald ). Gilson, "Globalizing corporate governance: Convergence of form or function" 
(2001) 49 American Journal of Comparative Law 329. 
102 Coffee, "The future as history"; Coffee, "Racing towards the top?" 
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Overall, we do see some trends toward convergence, but it is unclear 
how fast they will develop and the extent to which they will mimic the 
Anglo-American model or something else. For example, in India and 
China over the last decade we see greater protections for minority 
shareholders, increased customization, independence requirements, 
enhanced disclosure, more expectations of the board and audit commit­
tee for monitoring and increased obligations on executives. These all 
seem consistent with the Anglo-American model for dispersedly held 
corporations. 
However, controlled (not dispersedly held) firms are still the most 
important and frequent players on the major Indian and ·Chinese 
exchanges. This is true even though many of the top corporations on 
the exchanges are relatively new players in the field. This suggests only 
partial convergence has occurred so far. The law is converging, but the 
corporations are still largely controlled not widely held. 
Further, the reforms in the Indian equity markets have progressed 
much faster than similar reforms in the Indian debt markets. Even now, 
the Indian corporate bonds markets are weak and insolvency laws 
painfully slow. 103 This reflects the political balance in India as it relates 
to debt and insolvency where labor interests are much more likely to 
block significant reforms in this sphere than in the equity sphere. 104 This 
suggests that - at least on the debt side - there are serious path depen­
dencies at work. What impact this will have on convergence in gover­
nance reforms on the equity side is still to be seen. 
In China, we witness a rather complex set of developments. There 
seems little doubt that a kind of "convergence" can be identified with 
respect to China's corporate governance and securities regulation norms. 
China's earliest incursions into corporate governance reform occurred 
under the protection of (then) Vice Premier Zhu Rongji and were in 
large part driven by a unique generation of "returned from abroad" 
( haigui) individuals who had received graduate-level law training in the 
United States and to a lesser extent the UK and Commonwealth coun­
tries. Once corporatization and the establishment of stock exchanges 
became politically more palatable, these individuals implemented a 
103 See Jennifer Asuncion-Mund, "India's capital markets: Unlocking the door to future 
growth," Deutsche Bank Research Paper, February 1 4, 2007. 
104 See Madhukar R. Umarji, "Trends and developments in insolvency systems and 
risk management: The experience of India;' working paper (2004) ;  Vijay Joshi and 
I. M. D. Little, India's Economic Reforms 1991-2001 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 996); 
S. Thomas, "How the financial sector in India was reformed." 
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system closely patterned on what they had seen in more developed, 
foreign markets or, where they were unable to, they adjusted the laws to 
suit the specific needs of overseas investors. 105 Some of this initial conver­
gence was frustrated or even reversed when both the Company Law 1994 
and to a much lesser extent the Securities Law 1999 were captured by more 
conservative drafting groups and superseded earlier regulations. 106 Per­
haps more pernicious in the frustration of convergence was the stubborn 
capital structure of SO Es corporatized as companies limited by shares. As 
has been noted widely, China's new corporations continued to be owned 
at a level of 70-80% by former state bureaus or local government actors. 
Thus, we have witnessed adoption of legal forms suitable to the Anglo­
American model of the dispersedly held firm, but the actual firms still 
remain controlled rather than widely dispersed. We do not at this stage 
speculate as to why the PRC adopted a formally (not functionally) 
convergent corporate law, aside from the obvious reason that they could 
do it and still attract vast infusions of capital foreign and domestic - to 
prop up and then expand failing SOEs. 
Yet an important fact is the on-going, and far more realistic func­
tional, corporate governance reform in China (e.g., substantive changes 
in the Company Law, provision for shareholder suits on corporate 
breaches, establishment of an independent directors system, an increas­
ingly activist and independent financial media, and diluting the state/ 
legal person dominance at PRC issuers to create more widely dispersed 
capital structures) . Some might ascribe the impetus for these changes to 
the requirements of foreign investors and foreign regulatory systems, but 
that is a simplistic view. 107 It disregards the purely indigenous aspect of 
105 The 1 993 promise by the now defunct Commission for Reform of the Economic System 
to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange that a form of words in the 1 992 Opinion on 
Standards for Companies Limited by Shares governing PRC issuers to Hong Kong 
had the same meaning (and presumably effect) as the entire jurisprudence of "fiduciary 
duty" under Hong Kong law is a remarkable demonstration of this fact. 
106 For instance, the Company Law 1 994 contained a nonsensical Article 4 which main­
tained that state shareholders continued to own, directly, state assets contributed to the 
corporation, effectively looking right through the intervening corporate entity. By the 
same token, the Company Law 1 994 was replete with special provisions for what were 
SOEs, in all but name, including the troublesome creation of a "wholly state owned 
corporation" with no shareholders, no shareholders' meeting, but a board of directors 
appointed by the state department "owning" the company. 
1 07 It would also disregard the surprising fact that many purportedly sophisticated investors 
and portfolio managers continue to throw money at China's newly corporatized issuers 
regardless of the form or function of corporate governance, or the listing domicile, 
seemingly unable to miss a ride on the China "growth story." 
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the push for corporatization and better corporate governance at China's 
enterprises: Chinese forces which want better governed and more effi­
cient firms, policy makers who want healthier capital markets, regulators 
who want better markets and a "just" result for participants damaged by 
fraud, shareholders who want remedies or compensation, and the legal 
reform constituency which has a long-term "rule of law" agenda which it 
thinks can be implemented first in the corporate and commercial sector. 
The point is that China may now be moving past a period of formal-not­
functional convergence into functional (and sometimes formal) conver­
gence, and for reasons not directly related to the assumed req4irements 
of foreign external finance. This in turn may cause us to query why 
the PRC has consistently chosen the "shareholder oriented" model of 
business organization, a disclosure-based securities regulatory struc­
ture, and the beginnings of a private enforcement mechanism (as an 
adjunct to outright business regulation) - all in a world where everyone 
seems to admit that property rights are weak, the business regulation 
tradition is  weak, the courts are still deficient, and China has no experi­
ence with (or interest in allowing for) enterprises with widely dispersed 
shareholding. 
Indeed, when looking at both India and China one question 
constantly occurs: why have both countries adopted Anglo-American 
style corporate and securities law reforms - generally thought to be most 
suitable for widely held (Berle and Means described) firms - when 
neither country has seemed enthusiastic about encouraging such widely 
held firms in either new or old industrial sectors? Rather, both countries 
continue with largely controlled firms (though there are more new dis­
persedly held Indian firms than before) ,  and even some re-consolidation 
of previously devolved entities ( e.g., in China's aviation and power 
generation sectors) . Even the firms from India and China that list o n  
foreign exchanges are generally controlled firms. Moreover, at least for 
Indian firms these foreign securities exchanges are not their primary 
source of capital; for China, this is also becoming true, as even many of  
the solely offshore-listed (including Hong Kong SAR-listed) firms are 
returning to the Shanghai Exchange for large, follow-on, RMB yuan 
financings. Rather, such cross-listings appear more and more designed 
to  provide comfort to  the likely "products markets" customers of  the 
Indian and Chinese firms - US and European firms. 
One explanation may be that convergence is in the early stages in both 
countries. It may simply be that the laws are relatively new and that it will 
take some time for dispersed shareholdings to become more common o r  
568 NICHOLAS CALCINA HOWSON AND VIKRAMADITYA S. KHANNA 
politically palatable. However, both countries have been engaged in cor­
porate governance reforms for more than a decade and one wonders why 
newer firms have not sought more dispersed capital structures under the 
umbrella of legal and regulatory systems which would seem to lead them 
to the same. Of course, there is yet a broader question - why have adopted 
reforms aimed at one type of firm (widely held) been fairly successful 
at raising capital for different kinds of firms (controlled)? One could 
speculate that this is because the market is not responding as one might 
expect or the reforms are simply signals to investors about what to expect 
(i.e., better governance) or that some elements oflaws designed for widely 
held firms also help to reduce problems with controlled firms. 
VI. Conclusion 
China and India are the new economic juggernauts. Both countries have 
experienced phenomenal growth and dramatic interest from foreign 
investors. Both have survived the Global Financial Crisis 2008-9 in far 
better shape than most of their developed-world competitors. Indeed, 
the efforts of both countries to reform their corporate and securities laws 
to attract foreign and domestic investors and develop stock markets have 
been front page news. In this chapter we have explored how these 
reforms have come about and what we might learn from them. Although 
both countries have many differences, we suggest that the similarities -
rapid economic development, significant private and public foreign 
investment, economic and structural reform, booming stock markets and 
a shared interest (if not implementation) in "formal" Anglo-American 
corporate law norms - provide an interesting and rich platform for 
consideration of contested corporate governance and corporate govern­
ance reform issues. 
In order to explore these issues we began by briefly providing some 
political, economic and legal background for both China and India and 
then discussing their corporate governance reform efforts. Both coun­
tries have emerged from less market-oriented economic and regulatory 
systems to world-shaking economic reform programs, resulting in huge 
growth, the development of domestic capital markets and dominant 
participation in the global capital and product markets. And, in the case 
of each nation, this change has been matched by widely proclaimed 
corporate governance reform. Our central question revolves around 
the connection between the obvious developments in China and India, 
and the corporate governance reforms in both countries. When we 
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evaluate the experiences of these two economic juggernauts and try to 
apply them to corporate governance theories, we can gain interesting 
insights. In particular, both countries' experiences suggest that the "legal 
origins" account does not provide the best explanation for the develop­
ment of their respective corporate governance templates or domestic 
capital markets. Rather, a nuanced politics "account" provides greater 
explanatory power, especially when we try to understand the true effects 
of difficult and ultimately dislocating historical circumstances like 
India's Independence, English Colonial Rule and the trauma of Partition, 
and China's very difficult twentieth century at least to the end qf Maoist 
rule in 1 976. As noted in this chapter, both countries appear to have 
adopted, or are adopting, Anglo-American style corporate governance 
forms and reforms, yet most of the significant firms domiciled inside 
these nations (listed or not) remain stubbornly controlled. Thus, 
more than a decade after radical reform, the capital structure of China 
and India's corporations remains as it was: subject to overwhelming 
control by one or a group of connected and often politically powerful 
shareholders. Thus, perhaps the greatest puzzle raised by this initial 
inquiry is the fate and future of these corporate establishments - will 
they change to meet the structures assumed under the received Anglo­
American models of corporate governance and securities regulation? 
If they do not change, how is it that a l egal and regulatory strategy 
designed for different kinds of corporate entities and investor popula­
tions can continue to benefit the development of viable stock markets? 
These questions become increasingly important, not just for corporate 
governance specialists, as the world watches the rise of India and China 
in the global capital and product markets. 
Appendix 1 5 . 1  Comparing clause 49 and the J. J. Irani Committee recommendations 
Characteristic 
Independence 
Board requirements 
& limitations 
Audit Committee 
composition 
Clause 49 
• Requirement - 50% independent directors 
if Chairman is executive director or 33% if 
Chairman is not. 
• Definition - not related to Board or one level 
below Board and audit partners must have no 
prior relationship with the Company for the 
last 3 years. 
• "Material" - There is no requirement for the 
relationship to be "material." 
• Financial institutions are considered 
independent. 
• Meet 4 times a year (maximum gap of 3 
months between meetings) .  
• Limits on number of committees a director can 
be on ( IO), but only 5 for which director can be 
Chair of committee 
• Develop Code of Conduct. 
• At least 3 directors (two-thirds must be 
independent) .  
• All financially literate. 
• At least one having accounting or financial 
management experience. 
J. J. Irani Committee 
• Requirement - 33% for companies with public 
interest. 
• Definition - not related to employees of the 
Company and no prior relationship with the 
Company for one year. 
• "Material" - board to review what is "mater­
ial" on an on-going basis. 
• Financial institutions not considered 
independent. 
• Meet 4 times a year (maximum gap of 
4 months between meetings) .  
• Limits of number of directorships ( 1 5) .  
e No minimum number of directors (majority 
need to be independent). 
• No requirements for financial literacy. 
• At least one should have accounting/financial 
management knowledge. 
Audit Committee role 
and powers 
Disclosures 
Certifications 
Subsidiary 
Companies 
'" Audit Committee Meetings - 4 meetings (gap 
between meetings not exceed 4 months) .  
• Audit Committee role is broad - review statu­
tory and internal auditors as well as internal 
audit function. 
'" Related party transactions 
'" Accounting treatments and departures 
• Risk management 
'" Proceeds from offerings 
• Compensation for directors (including non­
executives and obtain shareholders' approval) 
.. Details of compliance history for last 3 years 
• Corporate governance reports (and disclose 
adoption, if any, of mandatory and 
non-mandatory requirements) 
• CEO & CFO: 
• financial statements 
• effectiveness of internal controls 
• legal transactions 
• inform audit committee of any significant 
changes in the above. 
• Auditor or Company Secretary: 
• Compliance with corporate governance 
• At least one Independent director of Holding 
Company should sit as a director on Board of 
material non-listed Indian subsidiary. 
• Audit Committee Meetings - number not 
specified. 
• Related party transactions 
• Executive compensation 
'" Unusual transactions 
• Director's background 
• CEO, CFO & Company Secretary 
e financials 
• CEO and CFO: 
., internal controls 
(with audit committee approval) 
Appendix 1 5 . 1  ( cont.) 
Characteristic 
Other 
Clause 49 
• Significant transactions report to Holding 
company Board (along with subsidiary board's 
minutes) .  
111 Whistleblower policy i s  optional. 
• Independent directors lose status as "indepen­
dent" if served 9 years at company. 
e Training board members. 
,. Evaluate non-executive board performance. 
J. J. Irani Committee 
• Whistleblower policy and protection for 
whistleblower is encouraged. 
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